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How NATO thwarted a Russian plan to sabotage undersea cables

NATO

In August, the director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), John Ratcliffe, visited his intelligence counterparts in Moscow, in part to warn Russia against escalating sabotage operations in Europe, two people familiar with the matter said.

In the deep waters of the Arctic, near the remote Svalbard archipelago, this spring, NATO allies discovered Russian submarines training to use a secret weapon, designed to disable critical undersea cables without leaving a trace.

The covert Russian operation, described to Reuters by two Western officials, was carried out by the Russian underwater warfare directorate GUGI, which used deep-sea submersibles to simulate the deployment of this sophisticated and destructive technology.

A joint operation involving Britain, Norway and the United States tracked and engaged the Russian ships at sea, the two officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity. The ships were prevented from completing the exercise and later left the area.

Britain and Norway announced in April that they had uncovered a covert Russian operation in Arctic waters. But the discovery of the new weapon, the location of the operation and US involvement had not previously been made public.

The deep-sea confrontation comes at a time when some Western intelligence officials fear that the Kremlin is stepping up sabotage operations in Europe and preparing for a conflict with NATO.

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Some U.S. intelligence analysts are increasingly concerned that Russia could test NATO's mutual defense pact, known as Article 5, three U.S. officials said. If that happens, destroying undersea cables could be a critical part of that effort, Western officials said.

The cables, no thicker than a garden hose, laid on the seabed or buried just below it, are essential for global internet connectivity and financial transactions. Their economic and strategic importance has made them targets in previous conflicts, including World Wars I and II, when they were vital for transmitting orders by telegraph or telephone.

Two submarine fiber-optic cables, each about 1,400 kilometers long, connecting Svalbard to mainland Norway, extend up to 2,700 meters below the sea surface. They transmit vast amounts of satellite data downloaded to the SvalSat satellite ground station, the world's largest, and part of NASA's near-Earth space network.

The Russian Defense Ministry did not respond to a request for comment on the incident. The Kremlin has consistently denied carrying out sabotage operations in NATO countries or planning any confrontation.

Some Western officials argue that Moscow's targeting of European states has intensified in recent months, while the front line in Ukraine has remained largely unchanged.

Countries such as Poland, Lithuania and Romania have confirmed various violations. Most recently, an attempted drone attack on Leipzig/Halle Airport in August prompted a series of reactions from Germany, including the closure of a Russian Consulate in Bonn and a cultural center in Berlin.

In August, the director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, John Ratcliffe, visited his intelligence counterparts in Moscow, in part to warn Russia against escalating sabotage operations in Europe, two people familiar with the matter said.

Reuters could not determine whether Ratcliffe raised the issue of covert Russian underwater operations. The Kremlin declined to say what was discussed or provide further details.

Training in the Arctic

At the same time as the confrontations at sea, British and Norwegian officials sent their findings to Moscow to show they were aware of the new technology, in the hope that this might make Russia hesitant to use it, the two Western officials said.

Russia did not damage any cables. The exercise focused on simulating the deployment of the technology in the event of a conflict with NATO, officials said. They declined to provide details on how the technology would work.

Asked for comment, NATO referred to Norwegian and British authorities.

"Through our joint operation, we sent a clear message to Russia that it cannot act covertly," Norwegian Defense Minister Tore Sandvik said in a statement.

"We have made it clear to the Russian authorities that any attempt to target our critical infrastructure will be detected and will have consequences. It is in no one's interest to escalate tensions in the Far North," he said.

The British Ministry of Defense referred to statements on April 9 that acknowledged suspected covert activities in and near Norwegian and British waters by the Russian Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research, known by its Russian acronym GUGI. Washington and London have imposed sanctions on the secretive directorate.

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The White House did not respond to a request for comment. The CIA declined to comment.

Any escalation between Russia and NATO could quickly highlight the strategic importance of an icy expanse of water between the southern tip of the Svalbard archipelago and mainland Norway, known as the "Bear Gap," one of the Western officials said.

To reach the Atlantic, Russian nuclear submarines based on the Kola Peninsula would pass through this body of water, about 640 kilometers wide, before passing near the remote volcanic Norwegian island of Jan Mayen.

Britain said this week that it had deployed forces to Jan Mayen in August, along with Norwegian and American allies, for an exercise aimed at demonstrating NATO's ability to operate together in the High North.

Norway plans to have a new fiber optic cable connecting Svalbard and Jan Mayen with mainland Norway by 2028.

"The growing Russian threat"

NATO allies have been focused on the security of underwater infrastructure since the destruction in 2022 of three of the four Nord Stream pipelines that supplied Germany with Russian gas. German prosecutors have indicted a Ukrainian who was a special forces officer at the time of the attack. Ukraine denies any role in the sabotage.

Since 2023, more and more ships have been slowly sailing over or near sensitive underwater infrastructure, including pipelines, power cables and telecommunications cables, to map their location. This activity is known as “drifting.”

Last year, such activity in the North Sea increased by 52%, to 13,079 ships from the previous year, according to data from maritime risk analysis company Windward.

Meanwhile, activity in the South China Sea region increased by 88%, to 18,401 ships.

It is not illegal to monitor infrastructure in international waters, but security experts see such extensive mapping as preparation for sabotage.

This activity and suspected interference with several cables prompted new initiatives launched in January last year, including NATO's Baltic Sentry monitoring system and the British-led Nordic Warden, which bring together naval forces for increased patrols of critical infrastructure.

In the Baltic Sea, one of the main monitoring areas, drifting activity in 2025 fell by 5% to 526 ships compared with the previous year, Windward data shows. The company said at least 11 undersea cables were damaged or severed in the Baltic between October 2023 and the end of last year.

“The current thinking is that Russia and China are probably the most active and critical undersea threats,” said Ami Daniel, Windward’s chief executive.

The global network of power and telecommunications cables that run along the seabed is expanding every year, driven by rising demand for data and electricity, partly due to artificial intelligence. Some analysts say Europe remains vulnerable.

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"Over the past 25 years, Europe has done two things simultaneously. It has dramatically expanded its dependence on seabed infrastructure and at the same time significantly reduced its capacity to protect that infrastructure," said Bruce Jones, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

"It is only now, belatedly, rebuilding this capacity, in the face of a rapidly growing Russian threat," Jones added.