Will KFOR Defend Kosovo?

Despite Kosovo’s importance to European peace and security, KFOR has failed to respond effectively to Serbia’s increasingly aggressive actions. KFOR must change strategy before it is too late

Serbia’s aggressive rhetoric and military-related activity – both kinetic and hybrid – have escalated sharply in recent years; as a result, Kosovo’s security is today imperiled to an extent not seen since 1999. KFOR is key to deterring Serbian aggression, but significant doubts now exist about its capacity and willingness to do so.

Serbia’s Increased Aggression

The timeline of incidents over recent years illustrates the severity of Serbia’s actions. In May 2023 KFOR troops were attacked by Kosovo Serbs protesting at the election of Albanian mayors in Kosovo’s four northern municipalities. A month later three Kosovo police officers were kidnapped by Serbian police inside Kosovo and taken to Serbia. In July that year Alicia Kearns MP – the Chair of the UK Foreign Affairs Select Committee – warned that British troops had observed weapons being smuggled into Orthodox monasteries in the north of Kosovo from Serbia; though this was denied by KFOR, two months later a heavily armed Serbian militia attacked the Kosovo police in Banjska, killing one officer, before taking refuge in an Orthodox monastery. The government of Serbia declared a day of mourning for the three militia killed and the leader of the group – Milan Radoičić, a close associate of President Vučić – remains at large despite admitting to having been directly involved. The weapons used by the attackers were supplied from Serbia and the government of Kosovo has uncovered many caches of arms since the attack. 

In November 2024 Serbian militia launched what the EU described as a “terrorist attack” against a water canal in Zubin Potok in northern Kosovo. Kosovo’s Police Director and Interior Minister revealed in September this year that Kosovo’s airspace has been violated by drones suspected of entering from Serbia, and last month, Serbian gendarme shot a Kosovo Serb known to be opposed to the Belgrade-controlled Serbian List party and abducted him to Serbia. 

Throughout this period President Vučić and many other key ministers have repeatedly claimed that the government of Kosovo is engaged in “ethnic cleansing against the Serbian people” without any evidence.

All of the above strongly suggest that the risk of a Crimea-style intervention by Serbia is very real. In response to protests against their authoritarian regime, Serbia’s leadership may attempt to unify the population around a manufactured crisis in Kosovo. Indeed, the Banjska attack was arguably an ill-disguised attempt to create the conditions for Serbia to send forces over the border to “protect” ethnic Serbs.

KFOR’s Failings 

Many have argued that KFOR’s presence assures Kosovo security; KFOR is mandated to deter “renewed hostilities” and establish “a secure environment”, but its response to Serbia’s escalating aggression to date casts doubts over its readiness to do so. 

While KFOR engaged the Serbian mobs rioting in the north of Kosovo in May 2023 – sustaining a number of casualties in the process – its response to other incidents suggests a marked unwillingness to respond appropriately to – and publicly acknowledge – the true nature of the threat facing Kosovo. The smuggling of arms from Serbia into Kosovo continues and Serbian forces now routinely act with near impunity inside Kosovo. KFOR is very obviously failing to meet its core mission objectives.

The increase in KFOR’s troops numbers this year, though welcome, is insufficient; given the current threat levels, the approximately 5000 troops currently stationed in Kosovo is simply not enough. Yet, beyond troop numbers, a larger problem looms; the will to act. KFOR’s inability to respond in an effective way to Serbia’s aggression can at best be blamed on incompetence, at worst an unwillingness to do so.

KFOR’s response to date has certainly been characterized by lethargy and complacency; though KFOR statements issued in response to the incidents noted above have reiterated a commitment to their mandate, the lack of urgency and proactive engagement is telling. Worryingly, this appears to be related to geopolitical considerations which have ominous implications for Kosovo’s security. 
The presence within KFOR of non-recognizing countries Greece, Slovakia, Moldova, and Romania, together with countries sympathetic to Serbia, such as Hungary – which has the third largest troop contingent in NATO (469 troops) – means many contributing states are disinclined to defend Kosovo’s sovereignty against Serbian aggression. Indicatively, the government of Slovakia – in violation of KFOR’s mandate – has stated their troops are deployed to Kosovo to protect ethnic Serbs. As Kosovo’s traditional allies – the UK, US, France, and Germany – have been distracted by domestic instability, the war in Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East, their interest in demanding that KFOR take a more assertive approach has waned.

The Key Questions

Journalists, civil society and political parties in Kosovo must demand clarity from KFOR about its actions to date and its ongoing commitment and readiness to respond to Serbian attacks.

Specifically, KFOR must be asked to respond clearly to the following key questions;

1. The Banjska Attack: 
Did KFOR have intelligence about the build-up of weapons and ammunition in north Kosovo in the lead up to the Banjska attack in September 2023 and if so, what action was taken on the basis of this information?

2. Cross Border Violations:
Since 2023 there have been several violent incursions across the border resulting in injuries and abductions; why has KFOR been unable to stop Serbian forces crossing the border repeatedly and what is the plan to prevent future Serbian incursions?

3. Arms Smuggling
Why has KFOR been unable to prevent arms beings smuggled into Kosovo, what new measures have been implemented to prevent this going forward, and can KFOR confirm these arms have come from Serbia with Belgrade’s knowledge? 

4. Troop Numbers
When and how will KFOR review troop numbers and composition to ensure it can fulfil its mandate to deter and prevent Serbian forces from entering Kosovo?

5. Use of Force
Several troop-contributing nations in KFOR are working closely with Serbia on defence agreements while others do not recognise Kosovo; what measures has KFOR taken to ensure that all its troops will use force if ordered to do so should Serbian troops or Gendarmes cross the border into Kosovo?

The Serbian government’s repeated calls for the creation of a “Serbian World” threaten regional peace and echo Milosevic’s “Greater Serbia” plan in the 1990s. Kosovo’s independence is a vital barrier to the realization of this inevitably destructive goal. Despite Kosovo’s importance to European peace and security, KFOR has failed to respond effectively to Serbia’s increasingly aggressive actions. KFOR must change strategy before it is too late.

Lt Col (Retd) Ade Clewlow MBE, former KFOR Liaison Officer to the Kosovo Protection Corps 2008/09, Dr Aidan Hehir, Professor of International Relations, University of Westminster, UK