Germany and Kosovo: A journey through diplomacy

I refuse to say that the book "The Role of German Foreign Policy towards Kosovo 1990-2008" by Sylë Ukshini - published by "Artini", Prishtina, 2025 - is an additional title on the shelf of our libraries, but I can state with full responsibility that it represents the first of its kind that speaks so concisely and precisely about the German position towards Albanians and Kosovo in particular.

Although we are witnesses of such a historical era where the book and the written word unfortunately do not have the appreciation and attention they deserve, I consider that the book is a sine qua non condition for the intellectual rise of a society that aims to take its place in the flow of developed nations and societies. Meanwhile, works of historical and scientific value are a precious treasure for Albanian science, culture, knowledge and thought. Even more so when it comes to works that deal with the political developments that Kosovo went through at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, which set international diplomacy and the most powerful actors on the planet in motion.

Of this nature is the work entitled: "The Role of Germany's Foreign Policy Towards Kosovo 1990-2008" by former diplomat and professor Sylë Ukshini, and I feel pleasure in expressing my impressions of this book through writing.

I refuse to say that the book in question is an additional title on the shelf of our libraries, but I can state with full responsibility that it represents the first of its kind that speaks so concisely and precisely about the German position towards Albanians and Kosovo in particular.

The author of this valuable work has faithfully followed the scientific instruments by presenting the objectives, definition and methodology of the study to the readers. Thus, he has used various documents from German state institutions, texts from the German press of the time, public speeches in the Bundestag, has consulted books by eminent German authors on the crisis in Kosovo, various memoirs, etc. Meanwhile, the interviews (as primary sources) that the author has conducted with German public figures who were directly involved in the Kosovo issue also give added value to the book.

It is worth saying that Sylë Ukshini not only provides us with data from German, English or Albanian sources, but he analyzes and interprets them. While having over 1000 footnotes or dozens of pages of bibliography is truly evidence of a sublime and laborious work undertaken by the author. The book is organized in such a way that it includes an introductory part, five chapters, conclusions, and literature used.

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In fact, the five chapters represent five historical periods in which the position of the Federal Republic of Germany towards Kosovo has moved from 1990, during those difficult periods for Albanians, until the declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo. Thus, this work not only reveals the chronological aspect of German-Kosovar relations, but various researchers and scholars, through this book, have the opportunity to become acquainted with the role of the German factor in developments in the Balkan and European contexts.

The now unified Germany had become a great power and an important factor in Europe, about which at the time, even British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand had expressed concerns (Peter Shearman).

In this context, a Germany with extraordinary economic and financial weight, and with a new demographic structure after unification, naturally would not be negligent about the events in Yugoslavia in the 90s.

In the first chapter, the author highlights that, however, during this period 1990-95, the Federal Republic of Germany wanted to avoid any contradictions and clashes with its partners regarding the suspicions that it would rise to a hegemonic status in Europe, and therefore operated cautiously towards Kosovo. At the same time, it aimed for international institutions to be used for the peaceful and multilateral resolution of conflicts. (p. 77). Thus, Germany's actions can be read in the context of institutional liberalism, which in the German case meant civilian power.

At this stage, according to the author, it was evident that the German government aimed to avoid misunderstandings about its foreign policy positions and was more restrained than in the case of Slovenia or Croatia. This can also be observed during the meeting of the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, with the Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi and with Nikë Gjeloshin. Apparently, the German policy followed the European policy towards the Kosovo problem, which was coordinated by the Working Group on Human and Minority Rights. (p.95.)

But on the other hand, the author continues, Germany began to share the American view, as it also assessed the tense situation in Kosovo as a potential hotbed of crisis (p. 101).

Of interest to readers is undoubtedly another important fact when it comes to the German position in the new international environment. More precisely, the 1994 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, which allowed the German military forces (Bundeswehr) to participate beyond Germany's borders in the framework of collective security.

The second chapter of this book deals with the post-Dayton period, the German role within the Contact Group as a multilateral forum for discussing peace and stability in Europe. In fact, in this part of the study, the author discusses on the one hand the escalation of fighting and the escalation of Serbian violence and crimes in Kosovo, and on the other hand the German efforts to find a solution. For the author, since the escalation of the situation in Kosovo, the German government closely aligned its course with that of the United States of America. (p.126) This suggests that the USA, in the context of the post-Cold War European security architecture, already saw the German factor as an inevitable ally.

It is worth mentioning that Germany was interested in the Russian factor being included in the stability of Europe and Western initiatives, especially when, in the new conjuncture of the international structure, Russian politics, led by President Yeltsin and the head of Russian diplomacy, Andrei Kozurev, was in the process of transformation and internal consolidation. At the same time, the German state was careful not to jeopardize its relations with France and Great Britain. In this regard, it seemed that the German political establishment, in other words, was following the path of Bismarck.

Furthermore, the author competently informs us about the debates within the Bundestag and the main forces of German politics on developments in Kosovo, the inclusion of the NATO Alliance, the German press on the Recak massacre, as well as the demands of the head of German diplomacy Joschka Fischer for Milosevic.

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A separate chapter is dedicated to the Rambouillet Peace Conference, within the framework of this book, which, as it states, made it clear to the parties that this was the last opportunity to reach a political solution. (p. 177). According to Sylë Ukshini, despite the fact that Germany did not take a central role in this conference, German policy was oriented above all towards a comprehensive multilateral approach, even describing it as quite active, and the close cooperation between US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and German Foreign Minister Fischer is particularly noteworthy.

This chapter argues that for the German government trio, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder; Joschka Fischer and Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping, resolving the conflict was in the interest of Germany's security and the EU itself, due to the possibility of regional expansion of the war. (p.192).

Chapter four examines Germany’s participation in the war and in the NATO military campaign in Kosovo. In my opinion, this can be considered one of the most significant parts of this study that we have before us. It deals with the German justification for participating in the war, which came after all efforts had been exhausted, and which, according to Chancellor Schröder, “...Germany and the Allies defend the common fundamental values ​​of freedom, democracy and human rights.”

NATO's military intervention in Kosovo actually highlighted two opposing concepts of international political relations, that of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs on the one hand and the prevention of brutal violations of human rights on the other. In the case of Kosovo, it was precisely the NATO alliance with this that Germany acted in favor of human rights and the doctrine of intervention for humanitarian issues. Interestingly, despite the criticism of the radical left, the majority of the government coalition, as well as the opposition CDU/CSU and FDP, agreed that Germany should take responsibility for joining a possible NATO action. (p. 223)

In the discussions of this chapter, the author Ukshini does not leave out the SPD Congress and the discussions on the Kosovo issue therein. In our interest it would be appropriate to mention that it was precisely the Congress in question that supported the initiative for a Stability Pact for the Balkans, which practically became the EU's long-term political vision towards the Balkan region. How important was the German role in the Kosovo issue, it is enough to see that the Fischer Plan, which was presented to the public in April '99, paved the way for the presence of international peacekeeping troops, the return of refugees, or rather, some of its elements would later find a place in UN Resolution 1244. (p. 262).

According to Sylë Ukshin, during this stage of the bombing, the efforts of Germany and other countries were mainly focused on engaging the Russians on the Western side in order to isolate Milošević. Chapter four ends by providing a treatment of the German turn (Zeitenwende) and the deployment of German troops within KFOR.

The fifth and final chapter of this study sheds light on the German factor after the end of the war in Kosovo and the epilogue of the status of Kosovo. The fact that Germany had sent 8.500 soldiers to Kosovo – the largest military contingent abroad that Germany had ever stationed – and had its own sector, was evidence that this country was taking an essential role not only in making war but also in making peace in Kosovo. (p. 323).

During this period, Germany was quite active in the fact that it activated the Contact Group to advance the issue of Kosovo. Meanwhile, as far as the issue of final status is concerned, Germany sought coordinated action in a multilateral context. Author Ukshini, thanks to this chapter, also points out the efforts of the renowned German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger within the framework of the “Troika” to find a solution on the status.

This work by researcher Sylë Ukshini ends by addressing the recognition of Kosovo's independence by the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the debates of the German political spectrum. In the context of this, it should be mentioned that the CDU/CSU parliamentary group supported the government's decision to recognize Kosovo, and for them, recognition by as many states as possible creates lasting stability for the entire region. According to this parliamentary group, among the reasons that led to the declaration of Kosovo's independence was that all possibilities for negotiations had been exhausted and the conditions set by the Ahtisaari Plan, including the protection of the Serbian minority, were accepted by Kosovo... (p. 377).

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Overall, this book can be of use to researchers of political science, international relations, historians, diplomats, etc. Finally, we also have suggestions for the author, hoping that the eventual reprint will include the cooperation of bilateral relations between the two states after the declaration of Kosovo's independence and that the book will be orthographically proofread before going to press.

We wish the author health and further success in the professional and academic fields, and of course, other publications.