From stabilocracy to the consolidation of personal power: The transformation of the political game

The political game in Kosovo has changed radically since 2021. Tired of the system of stabilocracy and coalitions of convenience, citizens took the situation into their own hands and gave absolute power to a party that was an implacable opponent of that system. In political science, the phenomenon of an anti-system party gaining power has also been documented elsewhere. So, Kosovo is no exception. Anti-system parties have also won in other countries with a consociational system, because citizens are tired of the games of parties that have exploited the system for group and party benefit. However, it has not yet been theorized what happens after an anti-system party gains absolute power. It is likely that the case of Kosovo will provide political science with the main lessons in this regard.

For more than twenty years, Kosovo has been governed by a system of stabilocracy, in which political parties have entered into post-electoral coalitions, adapting the needs of the country to their political interests in order to be in government. They have been, therefore, coalitions of political convenience, which have fallen from power through early elections, whenever it has no longer been convenient for one of the parties to remain in the coalition. Nevertheless, in this political vortex, a stability of institutional instability has been created, for which many, including me, have believed that the main fault lies with the proportional electoral system with generous provisions for minority representation with 20 parliamentary mandates, which has made it impossible to create stable parliamentary majorities.
However, this situation began to change in the early elections of 2017, when the LVV increased from 13.6% of the vote in 2014 to 27.5%, as a single party. At that time, when I was working as a political analyst for BIRN's "Balkan Insight" portal, I had said in an analysis published on August 29, 2017, after the June elections, with the title "Vetevendosje Set to Dominate Kosovo's Future Political Scene", that the result of the 2017 elections shows that in the future the LVV will be the dominant political force in Kosovo. And this prediction turned out to be correct because in 2021, the LVV won over 50% of the citizen vote. After these elections, we had a stable parliamentary majority, which ensured the government led by the leader of the LVV, Albin Kurti, an unhindered continuity of government for four years in a row. Of course, this majority is attributed to the coalition between LVV and the Guxo List, led by Vjosa Osmani, who, due to personal dissatisfaction, had abandoned her parent party, the LDK. Since she enjoyed great popularity in the LDK, a significant number of disappointed voters of this party voted for the LVV-Guxo List coalition. Logically, with the division of the main state positions, Osmani was elected president for a five-year term, while Kurti was elected prime minister.
The February 2025 elections, the first regular ones since the declaration of independence in 2008, did not give the LVV the parliamentary majority that Kurti expected. With 42% of the vote, he failed to convince any of the opposition parties to enter into a post-election coalition with his party. In fact, he had extended an invitation to form a governing coalition only to the LDK, but this invitation was, for good reason, not considered sincere and the LDK rejected it. After a protracted saga over the election of the Speaker of Parliament, the matter went to the Constitutional Court, which after several decisions was forced to clarify the procedures for electing the Speaker of Parliament and the government, which interrupted the endless circus of Albulena Haxhiu's re-nomination for Speaker of the Assembly and paved the way for the candidacy of Dimal Basha, who also received the votes of the PDK, which gave him enough votes to unblock the formation of the institutions. However, the LVV did not have a partner for the formation of the government, which resulted in the extraordinary elections of December 28, 2025. 
Although the president did a good service to the LVV by setting the election date, according to Kurti's preferences – during the holidays when a large number of his diaspora supporters would come to Kosovo to vote – he turned his back on Osmani, not giving her the necessary signatures for her candidacy for a second presidential term. This happened at a time when President Osmani has strongly profiled herself in the international arena as the main Kosovar interlocutor with the international community. Her strengthening on the international political scene, with her participation in the Peace Board, warm relations with US President Donald Trump, and four new international recognitions, have left Kurti in the shadow. With over 51% of the votes won on December 28, 2025, he is aiming to consolidate and strengthen his personal power, by eliminating all former partners, including Osmani, who could jeopardize his undisputed leadership. For this, his party officially announced the candidacy of his close ally, fellow party member, Glauk Konjufca. 
The question arises whether eliminating Vjosa Osmani as president and main representative of Kosovo on the international stage, at a time of geopolitical tectonic movements, when she enjoys the sympathy of key international figures, including President Trump, is a good idea? 

In this context, the figure of Konjufca is not inappropriate. He has political experience, including in foreign policy. However, there are two key issues: Will he be a unifying figure in domestic politics and will he have the success and operational autonomy of Vjosa Osmani? 

As Speaker of the Assembly, Konjufca has performed his role quite well, respecting parliamentary procedures and giving space, according to democratic principles, to all opposition parties. 
So, I don't believe there is any question about his personal integrity as a leading figure. 

However, the question arises as to Kurti's motives for replacing Osman with Konjufca. The election of Konjufca as head of state raises many questions regarding the roles of the prime minister and the president in foreign policy. Which of them (Konjufca or Kurti) will play the main role in Kosovo's foreign policy? 

Since this article started from the hypothesis that the reason why Kurti turned his back on Osman is to strengthen her on the international stage and consequently increase her domestic popularity, then it turns out that by running a fellow party member for president, Kurti aims to eliminate Osman in order to consolidate and strengthen his personal power. This motive of Kurti comes naturally after the support of more than half of Kosovar voters for him. With the convincing electoral victory, he no longer sees the continuation of the alliance with Osman as necessary. Moreover, since her stay in the post of president has transformed the political alliance into a personal rivalry. 

The LVV has enough votes to elect Konjufca president in the third round, even without the opposition's votes, when the presidential candidate only needs 61 votes to be elected. 

But how should the opposition parties act? I remind you that they must act in accordance with the will of the citizens, expressed on December 28, 2025, and remain in the plenary session, regardless of their positions for or against Konjufca. Kurti's game with the "candidate" of someone from the Jashari family, even though he was told that none of them accepts the candidacy, before mentioning the Jashari family publicly, as well as the game with consultations with the PDK and LDK, were intended to mask his intention to eliminate Vjosa Osmani. With the political constellation created on December 28, when the citizens gave him "la carte blanche", Kurti's political movements naturally go towards strengthening his personal power with full popular support. Whether this strengthening of power is to the detriment of democracy in the long term, for this again the popular will is decisive, because the fundamental principle of democracy is the implementation of the will of the majority. When there is no majority, democracy requires compromises and finding political ways to govern, which LVV refused throughout the year when it did not have a majority. This refusal of LVV brought it an uncontested second mandate, therefore, its leader, rightly or wrongly but with full popular legitimacy, is seeking to strengthen his power. Where this will lead remains to be seen in the coming period.

In conclusion, the political game in Kosovo has changed radically since 2021. Tired of the system of stabilocracy and coalitions of convenience, citizens took the situation into their own hands and gave absolute power to a party that was an implacable opponent of that system. In political science, the phenomenon of an anti-system party gaining power has also been documented elsewhere. So, Kosovo is no exception. Anti-system parties have also won in other countries with a consociational system, because citizens are tired of the games of parties that have exploited the system for group and party benefit. However, it has not yet been theorized what happens after an anti-system party gains absolute power. It is likely that the case of Kosovo will provide political science with the main lessons in this regard.

(The author is a doctor of political science).