The State in Waiting and Political Rivalry

Kosovo needs decisions and actions that orient it towards the future, not for the continuation of the electoral race even after the end of the electoral process. It should be borne in mind that our political and constitutional system is of a consensual nature – and only on this basis can a functional national policy be built. Kosovo needs sustainable compromises, constructive cooperation and decision-making oriented towards the future – not for internal political consumption. Only in this way can the path towards integration into the international system and the construction of a functional state be accelerated

Kosovo is at an important stage of political developments after the February 9 elections. The focus is on the formation of the new government, which is expected to face a series of challenging tasks. In this regard, maintaining legality remains essential, which, in reality, would mean preserving the constitutional order and existing institutions. It was precisely this legality pursued over the years that preserved constitutionality and institutional credibility, installing the belief that the vote is the only instrument for governmental transition. First of all, a great responsibility awaits the future government: to lead the country in a complicated period, characterized by internal challenges, political polarization and a complex geopolitical context. Kosovo cannot remain hostage to the personal egos of politicians. But, more or less, the current situation is a reflection of a climate of distrust and conflict that began with the political stalemate of the summer of 2013.

Despite the extremely contrasting interpretations between the ruling party and the opposition regarding legal issues — behind which party political interests are often hidden — the country's government should be formed without the need for international assistance. This is possible, as long as the country's interest is preserved through the protection of legality and the constitution. Only the lust for power triumphs over state reason, because for someone it is never too late for anything. The ancient truth shows that power is also one of the greatest weaknesses of human beings. In love with power, the individual lies not only to himself, but also to others. He speaks of grandiose goals, but has only personal success as a priority. This approach must be abandoned in order to avoid betraying electoral promises. Nothing else is more important than the prompt formation of the country's institutions. This is necessary not only for the interest of Kosovo's citizens, but also for its international image. So, it is important to have a stable government with a solid majority and competent ministers, even after a year the next impasse is scheduled, which is repeated after every election, to find a compromise on the figure of the country's president. The deal for the government must be motivated by the state interest, as well as by the country's need for a stable government, even for the moment any compromise seems  simply impossible even though more than two months have passed since the people of Kosovo voted in the elections. It is not good news that foreign diplomats are declaring the need to overcome this situation, when the citizen of the country does not know who is an angel and who is a devil. In his statement, the British ambassador to Kosovo, Jonathan Hargeaves, stated that “Kosovo urgently needs a functional Assembly and government. The people have the right to demand that their political leaders work together for the national interest.”

Toad  to form a government, the most sensitive and urgent issue that hangs like a thick fog over the country is the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, where the parties continue to have diametrically opposed interests and goals. The European Union, as soon as we have a new government, will rush to restart a new chapter of the dialogue for the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations – a process that, even after thirteen years, has not yielded substantial results nor has it met the expectations of the parties, neither Kosovo nor the EU and Serbia. This, as long as Belgrade continues to pursue a territorial hegemonic agenda, accompanied by an aggressive discourse and derogatory language towards Kosovo Albanians – language that brings back memories of the Serbian nationalist rhetoric of the 80s.

On the other hand, the European Union's stance seems unbalanced: while it applies punitive measures to Kosovo and hinders its efforts to join the Council of Europe, it maintains a moderate approach towards Serbia - a destabilizing actor in the region - in the name of preserving Western influence and fearing its alignment with Russia.

Migration, an issue that needs to be addressed

A high priority for the Government of Kosovo is addressing the issue of the emigration of the Kosovo population to developed EU countries. The dominant age group is mainly young people, motivated by expectations of higher salaries and better working conditions in the destination countries. In the last ten years, it is estimated that half a million Kosovars have left. Therefore, addressing the issue of emigration from Kosovo requires addressing a number of economic, political and social factors that contribute to people leaving the country. Instead of party political competitions in the diaspora, they should pay national importance and attention to the issue of the emigration of young people. As a friend jokingly said: if in the 90s in the diaspora we had the government and the population inside, now we have the government in the country, and the population in the diaspora. What is urgent is the improvement of the health care and education systems to raise the quality of life for citizens. The millions spent on treatment in the countries of the region and the EU could be channeled into building better medical infrastructure and services in the country. Strategic planning and the development of long-term plans that address the root causes of migration and provide a roadmap for sustainable development.

To better and more accurately understand  the causes and motives why the population of Kosovo migrates, the new Government of Kosovo should focus on the main indicators of the economic situation and well-being of the population. We must admit, due to the circumstances that Kosovo has been through in the former Yugoslavia and in the delayed process of independence, it is the poorest country in Europe, with a low GDP. Finally, the time has come to make "tallava" politics with the diaspora, because in the end no one sees the benefit of this form of politics. The way of communication with the diaspora must also change, beyond remittances and euphoric nationalist rhetoric. Simply, they must be created with all the opportunities and instruments to invest in Kosovo, where their investment is guaranteed and generates profit for the investor and greater employment in the private sector.

Clarification of relations with the EU

Without a doubt, one of the biggest challenges for Kosovo at this moment is the formation of a new government without artificial delays. The new government, first of all, must undertake a clear and determined process for clarifying Kosovo’s relations with the European Union. There are a number of issues that require rapid responses and serious institutional commitment – ​​the situation cannot be ignored as if nothing had happened.

First of all, in addition to lifting the punitive measures, the continuation of the dialogue with Belgrade should have a clearer thematic structure and a defined time frame. If the European Union is truly interested in the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, then it should change its current approach. Initially, Kosovo should be recognized by the five EU member states that have not yet done so. Only after that can we talk about a genuine process of normalization. This is the logical order of things and should be the leitmotif of all meetings of Kosovo officials with Brussels representatives.

Secondly, if Serbia continues to abuse the dialogue and at the same time oppose international recognitions of Kosovo, the continuation of the dialogue process becomes meaningless and unequal in every respect. If we start from the principle that national security is not a matter of promises, then it must be clearly acknowledged that the formation of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities cannot happen without a comprehensive and legally binding agreement, which includes a clear perspective of Kosovo's membership in the European Union and NATO.

At the same time, the dialogue cannot continue as long as the non-recognizing EU countries create administrative and diplomatic barriers to Kosovo and in international organizations take the side of Russia and other countries that continue to contest Kosovo's statehood. It is unimaginable that at a time when the European Commission has been ensuring that punitive measures against Kosovo are maintained for two years, African countries such as Kenya and Sudan recognize Kosovo's statehood. This sounds even more naive and absurd when  For many decades, the idea that the Western Balkan countries have prospects for EU integration has continued to be promoted.

Another absurdity is how it is possible for Turkey alone to do more in the process of recognizing Kosovo than 22 EU member states combined, especially when Brussels interprets the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue as an instrument for bringing these two Balkan countries closer to the EU. In addition, if at the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when Slovenia and Croatia were the first to become independent, their recognition went through the international legal legitimization of Badinter's opinions and the principles for recognizing new states in December 1991.

Meanwhile, while the ICJ and other international institutions have spoken out in favor of Kosovo's independence, non-recognizing EU countries reject the legal opinion of a more credible institution as well as the fact that Kosovo has long fulfilled the principles for recognizing new states of December 1991.

In fact, the entire EU relationship with Kosovo has been reduced to fulfilling a Serbian demand for the formation of an Association, which Serbia sees as an instrument for weakening the central government of Kosovo, a strategy also pursued in Dayton in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the bad experience in Bosnia, the insistence of the EU, but also of the US, on the formation of such a body within the political and legal system of Kosovo is surprising. One thing should be clear to everyone, including the Government of Kosovo, that even in the event of the formation of this uniethnic Association, Kosovo-Serbia relations will not be normalized. On the contrary, these relations will only become more complicated, as Belgrade has persistently pursued the strategy of weakening the state of Kosovo over the years.

The current EU stance on Kosovo seems to be the same as in the 1990s when, due to historical ties dating back to World War I, it was committed to finding any solution that did not exclude Belgrade's sovereignty over Kosovo. It is this same EU that in April 1996 recognized Milosevic's truncated Yugoslavia, which was a euphemism for Greater Serbia, at a time when Albanians lived as if in apartheid and without any human, political or national rights. The EU had rewarded Milosevic considerably  for a job well done at Dejaton.

Taking British Prime Minister Keir Starmer's statement "The world as we knew it is gone," the new Kosovo government should prioritize the issue of diversifying its foreign policy so that the EU does not take it so seriously as long as Brussels ignores to the point of contempt the consideration of Kosovo's application for EU membership, which is evidence that the EU's approach to Kosovo violates European standards itself. The EU's position should also be measured by the way Brussels is being overzealous and ruthless in maintaining punitive measures against Kosovo, while against Serbia, due to old historical alliances,  stands idly by and is extremely tolerant even when Belgrade undertakes an armed attack like the one in Banjska or when the Serbian political elite follows a pro-Russian and pro-Chinese course, which calls into question the EU's goal of establishing long-term peace and stability in the region.

Priorities of the new Government

Another priority for the Government of Kosovo, which is expected to be formed within a few weeks, should be strategic decision-making, where the political elite should be determined to lead the people and not be led by them. Meanwhile, the government's decisions and projects should be oriented towards the future of the republic, and not towards creating positions and advantages for political parties. The interest of the republic should be at the center of political engagement. The first issue was not resolved this Tuesday, April 15, when, at the moment when the constitution of the Assembly was expected, a "legal" soap opera broke out about the legality of this process. If the issue drags on and again goes to constitutional issues like in 2013, then either the fault lies with our political and constitutional system, or the political class has replaced the issue of building the republic with the party agenda. It seems clear that the center of this political competition is not the construction of a new state,

the issue of Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe, as this would re-test the position of Serbia and the main EU countries. If Kosovo is again prevented from joining this pan-European institution, then the issue of dialogue loses all meaning, since dialogue from a lever for the consolidation of Kosovo's statehood is turning into a barrier and a means of deterring Kosovo's membership in international organizations. First of all, Kosovo should also focus on building its self-defense capacities, since the lack of a military balance is a handicap for the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations, at a time when the latter openly expresses its hegemonic intentions. For this, in addition to Turkey, another address  of Kosovo remain Great Britain and the USA, countries even more deserving of NATO intervention in the Kosovo war. At the same time, the issue of lobbying for diplomatic recognition should continue with increased intensity, as recognitions are important in the process of Kosovo's membership in international organizations. Above all, cultural and religious issues, which Serbia is trying to reopen for new accommodation beyond the Ahtisaari Plan, should be insisted on being addressed within the framework of the international organization UNESCO, where the issue of Kosovo's membership should also be included in the package.

Continuation of EU punitive measures against Kosovo: undermining the success of the dialogue

As we mentioned above, the continuation of the European Union's punitive measures against Kosovo is a unilateral action by Brussels and highly favorable to Belgrade, which, unlike Kosovo, behaves in the most discriminatory way towards the Albanian community in the Presevo Valley through the so-called process of "passivization" of the addresses of Albanian residents. In a word, this is a classic colonization only with new instruments, while the EU, also due to the silence of the Albanian factor, does not show any reprimand towards the Belgrade leadership. Seen from this perspective, it is naive, not to say overly ironic, to hope that with such an approach Kosovo-Serbia relations can be normalized. Moreover, just as with the Special Court, which clearly seemed to be formed to satisfy Serbia's ego and create symmetry over the past, the Association cannot move towards normalization, because along the way Serbia will present new demands, not to advance the rights of local Serbs, but to weaken the central power of the Kosovo Government and to delay its integration into the international system.

If the EU joins the Serbian victimization due to the elimination of Serbian parallel structures, which are criminal remnants of the Milosevic regime, then Brussels takes a one-sided role in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, starting from the premise of cultural and religious differences. If Germany is still asked today after eight decades to maintain a critical stance towards the legacy of World War II, in the case of Serbia, a closed-eye stance is the most preferred, since 25 years after the end of the war, an elite that was once part of the Milosevic establishment and government is recycled into power in Serbia. Given the case of Serbia, if something like this were to happen to Germany as well, then it is fitting that in 1970 we would have had in power not Willy Brandt, but one of the collaborators or ministers of the Nazi regime. So, why has Serbia not experienced denazification? The blame must be sought in the West, which throughout these decades has behaved more harshly towards the victims than towards the real aggressor, who throughout the 90s, with the crimes committed, brought to mind the Holocaust and other crimes of the Nazi regime.

Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue: Mutual Recognition at the Center

For 14 years, the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, initiated through a UN General Assembly Resolution, under the mediation of the EU, has not fulfilled any of its initial objectives. First of all, the EU has failed or deliberately not recognized the UN PA, sponsored by this institution, for every agreement reached in Brussels. In this sense, neither the last Brussels Agreement nor the Ohrid Annex were shared with the PA, the first with the aim of internationally strengthening the agreement in question and the second with the aim of making it known to the sponsors of the resolution that both countries had reached an agreement that should be followed by recognition and acceptance in international organizations.

Perhaps the current state of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is reflected in a joke on social media, according to which it would be better to have no dialogue and no new government so that recognitions from different countries around the world can take place.

There is no doubt that there is a better basis for international recognition of Kosovo than the ICJ opinion and the Ahtisaari Plan, which go beyond the European principles of December 1991 for the recognition of new states. In addition, the new government and the new negotiator of Kosovo, who should replace Deputy Prime Minister Bisnlimi, should be reviewing the Ohrid Agreement, since a sustainable agreement should not only be signed by visionary leaders for the future, but should also provide for mutual recognition. But we should not have any illusions that such a thing is unrealistic to expect to happen as long as the 5 non-recognizing countries are the main authors of undermining the European policy for creating long-term stability and sustainability in the Balkans. I do not believe that there is any official in Brussels who has not understood that the key to stability and lasting peace in the region remains closely linked to the issue of normalizing Kosovo-Serbia relations. On the contrary. As long as the Brussels dialogue aims for normalization without mutual recognition, it turns out that European officials only want to buy time, to maintain the political status quo, which is managed as a "theater" for hiding reality.

In retrospect, the state of the Brussels dialogue is worse than in 2013, when the First Agreement on Normalization was reached. And above all, the impression is created that in Brussels there are not two equal parties negotiating, but as if Serbia is trying to deconstruct the Ahtisaari Plan through the Brussels dialogue, which has already created many inhibiting mechanisms for the Albanian majority and the central government of Kosovo. If it is truly intended to get out of this deadlock in which the dialogue is currently located, then Brussels should change its approach, namely return to the model of the British-German non-paper of August 2013, according to which the conclusion of the dialogue process should have occurred with full normalization ("full normalization"). According to this document, the parties, Kosovo and Serbia, were also guaranteed  continuing their journey towards the EU, along with all the rights and responsibilities that this entails. Among other things, this document provided as a final conditionality the proposal of a binding mechanism that would prevent Kosovo or Serbia  to block each other on the path to the EU and this was proposed to take legal form within Serbia's accession treaty. Unfortunately, over the years and especially in the last five years, the political leadership in the EU and the US has reduced the claims  and the demands for a legally binding comprehensive agreement. Consequently, now no one in Brussels is talking about the finale of the dialogue and the principles of a legally binding comprehensive agreement.

Moreover, shortly after the finalization of the Ohrid Annex in March 2023, Serbia openly opposed the possibility of Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe, while the declaration of Germany, France and Italy against Kosovo's membership in the CoE, namely its conditioning on the submission of the draft statute of the Association to the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, only created an unimaginable favor for Serbia, since with such a stance they effectively recognized Serbia's ownership of Kosovo's membership right in international organizations. If in 2007 it was Russia and China that opposed the Ahtisaari Plan, in 2024 it was the EU countries that opposed Kosovo's membership in the CoE. Therefore, the efforts were in vain.  the Kosovo side to convince the European Union that Serbia's approach to Kosovo's efforts for membership in the CoE constituted a violation of the Ohrid Agreement. This moment, which proved that Serbia in fact has no obligation to implement all points of the agreement reached in Brussels and the Ohrid annex, which also included not obstructing Kosovo's membership in international organizations.

Given this, the new Government of Kosovo must have a clear geography of dialogue and judge whether this is the right moment for the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to  Foreign and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, together with the special representative in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, Peter Sorensen, to take the necessary actions to make the Brussels dialogue functional.

Hope for US assistance in dialogue

Given that Kosovo was a flashpoint between the West and Russia in the post-Cold War period, while the Contact Group was the informal coordination mechanism for addressing the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, one should not rule out the possibility that if the issue of the Ukrainian war is resolved, the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue will shift to Washington, as the most impartial party in all crises in the former Yugoslavia. Unlike the Europeans who historically have their clients in the Balkans, Washington in the last three decades was not helping a particular party, but establishing stability in Southeast Europe. This American position made it possible to maintain the unity of the majority of EU countries in supporting even Ahtisaari's proposal for Kosovo's independence, although since 2007 five EU countries have opposed this position and have followed the Russian and Serbian position towards Kosovo's independence. Without a doubt, the end of the war in Ukraine could mark a rapprochement between the US and Russia, which would not only serve as a counterweight to China, but could also mark the inclusion of Russia on board, similar to Rambouillet and the Vienna process, for reaching a settlement between Kosovo and Serbia. Taken as a whole, the US could offer the new Balkan states the opportunity to find a sustainable solution to their multicultural and multiethnic character of their societies, to create a modern democratic future and to move forward towards EU membership. If the United States were to be substantially involved in finding a real solution between the two small Balkan states, Kosovo and Serbia, they could become catalysts for regional integration and examples of solutions to political problems. At the same time, resolving the Kosovo-Serbia context could serve as an impetus for the West’s success in the region and at the same time this success could serve as a counterweight to Russian and Chinese influence in the region. In this sense, this imposes the need for the EU's foreign and security policy to be more cohesive and in line with these goals, otherwise the European countries themselves become underminers of the West's success in the region, or in other words, the EU becomes a danger to the region, because it is not enough to just consume the rhetoric that the Western Balkans have a European perspective.

cONcluSiON

Kosovo is in a crucial period for its future, therefore the composition of the government and the priorities it will pursue will be decisive for the pace of movement towards Euro-Atlantic integration. In this context, the country's political elite, instead of weighing the patriotism of this or that political entity, should focus on the program lines and the performance of the politicians who will take responsibility for leading the executive institutions.

What matters is not which subject a leader comes from or who voted for him, but what his objectives and capacities are to competently lead a certain department. The decision-makers of the Republic must have strategic objectives of the time in front of them and be determined to lead the country – not to be guided by the impulse of public opinion or by the interests of the moment.

Kosovo needs decisions and actions that orient it towards the future, not for the continuation of the electoral race even after the end of the electoral process. It should be borne in mind that our political and constitutional system is of a consensual nature – and only on this basis can a functional national policy be built. Kosovo needs sustainable compromises, constructive cooperation and decision-making oriented towards the future – not for internal political consumption. Only in this way can the path towards integration into the international system and the construction of a functional state be accelerated.