The "packaging" of Serbian hegemony behind the psychology of the victim (2)

Serbia has revived its claim to Kosovo, hiding behind the victimization of Serbs in Kosovo as a result of the arbitrary power of the Kosovar authorities, a Russian model used as justification for aggression in Eastern Ukraine.

The recent behavior of the French president, Macron, in Belgrade and his messages to the Kosovo Serbs, criticism of the Kosovo Government, show that Serbian propaganda and complaints have found that they have teams and lobbyists in the four corners of the world. Despite Belgrade's baseless accusations, now nobody comes to Kosovo's defense. This situation and this lack of support, even from our partners, should be a serious warning to the political elite of Kosovo. We are either wrong or too late. For Kosovo, which faces numerous challenges in the coming years, such as the epilogue of the Specialized Chambers, the issue of the community of municipalities with a Serbian majority, the issue of new arrangements for the Serbian Orthodox Church, it is necessary to build direct trust in between Kosovo and international allies. Of course, part of the responsibility also falls to the international factor, which with the successive requests to Kosovo for concessions in the Brussels Process and especially its insistence on the realization of two mono-ethnic projects, such as the Association and the Specialized Chambers, have consumed it in the way worse the confidence of the Kosovar majority public. However, now on the eve of the national elections, Kosovo must demonstrate wisdom and pragmatically avoid any Serbian scenario that repeats the scenario of the institutional boycott and the election of four mayors in the north, in which case Belgrade succeeded in presenting the Serbian population in Kosovo as a victim of the arbitrary actions of the Government of Kosovo.

Kosovo should avoid the Serbian approach for an unlimited dialogue and the European intention that sees the Brussels dialogue as an instrument for maintaining the status quo. The best example of this is the lack of results even after reaching the Brussels Basic Agreement and the Ohrid Annex, for which there were great interpretations and expectations both in the region and in the EU, even compared to the German-German Treaty of 1972. Immediately after Ohrid, when Vucic publicly despised the content of this agreement and refused to sign it, while the facilitator of the dialogue, in this case the EU, took care to justify the destructive behavior of Belgrade, it was clear that there was no question, but for the normalization agreement, as it did not create international legal obligations, despite the creative use of euphemisms by European mediators.

An even worse indicator was when Serbia, on the one hand, engaged in the Brussels dialogue and on the Open Balkans, while on the other hand, continued the international diplomatic aggression, which culminated again with the aggressive campaign against Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe, while only a few months ago, he carried out the military aggression in Banjska of Kosovo. To make the absurdity even greater, the sanction came in the direction of Kosovo: the first, due to the uncoordinated sending of the four presidents to their offices in the north of the country. In addition, the three main countries, Germany, France and Italy, joined Serbia's position against Kosovo's membership, with the condition that the Association Statute be sent to the Constitutional Court. While the Serbs had no obligation to Kosovo.  After Serbia passed "without a single stab in the leg" as in the case of Bansjka, it took the courage to contest every part of the agreement that implied de facto or de jure recognition through an official letter in December 2024. This Belgrade discourse was not a violation of the Ohrid Agreement, as is being said above and below, but an approval by Kosovo's friends of the German "equivalent" according to which "Serbian unity" is accepted, which means that Serbia can contest Kosovo's citizenship and at the same time act as if he has accepted Ohri. Encouraged by this position of the internationals, Belgrade came out openly to prevent Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe. Therefore, the language of the Serbian state towards Kosovo and the Albanians remained extremely hostile.

This asymmetric behavior of the EU has also deformed the purpose of the Brussels dialogue, which, if it moves at the current rates, needs  even thirteen  others to perhaps address the issue of whether the bridge over Ujjebardha should be opened or kept closed. This means that the final agreement is not even in sight. And just when it seems that it does not know what to do, the EU took the unilateral and unprecedented decision in the history of international relations, recognizing the illegal passports of Serbia, issued by the so-called "Coordinating Director for Kosovo and Metohija" for the Serbs of Kosovo. From this moment, the citizens of Kosovo have two passports: on one, the Kosovar one, it will be written that Pristina is the territory of the state of Kosovo, while on the other side, Pristina, Ferizaj, Gjilan and other cities are presented as the territory of Serbia . How is it possible that such a decision is passed within the EU by the 22 countries that have recognized Kosovo, and no other decision related to Kosovo's citizenship is passed, because the "heroic" five rebel, even though they have recognized Opinion of the ICJ on the occasion of the inclusion of this opinion in the UN Resolution of September 9, 2010.

It is not yet known how long the dialogue will last and how it will proceed and what final agreement it may produce. But this will depend more on the degree of US involvement in this conclusion of the electoral process for the new American leadership and on the course of the war in Ukraine than on Germany and France, which gave up before the full implementation began. and unconditionally of the Ohrid Agreement/Annex. It is evident that thirteen years after the beginning of the Brussels Process, the leadership in the US and the EU must show more determination to reach a comprehensive, legally binding agreement. Therefore, Kosovo has the right and must insist that Kosovo's membership in international organizations and the opening of negotiations for membership in the EU directly help the dialogue for the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia neighborly relations. Only a clear and tangible perspective of Kosovo towards EU and NATO membership helps the Brussels Process and forces Serbia to give up a double policy in relation to Kosovo: on the one hand, pretending to be negotiating for the normalization of neighborly relations, while on the other hand, to continue contesting Kosovo's independence and fight it everywhere. It is also important to ensure that the issue of the normalization of relations will not remain only a diplomatic phraseology of the EU, that Serbia's progress on the road to the EU would be conditional upon the achievement of a comprehensive and legally binding agreement, precisely as Great Britain and Germany had requested eleven years ago in their non-papers, but that in the meantime the EU gave up on this, perhaps not even bringing formal obligations to the five EU countries, which, with their obstinate stance against the independence of Kosovo, have actually undermined the EU's own success in Kosovo and in the region. Apart from that, Kosovo needs to be treated as a state more than European punitive unity  that has invested for generations. It is a terrifying irony if Spain, a European country, stands side by side with Russia and Iran in contesting the independence of Kosovo and rushes to recognize the independence of Palestine outside of any negotiation process, in the middle of the war in Gaza and only a few months  after the Hamas terrorist attack in Israel. In fact, the five EU states that have not recognized Kosovo's independence, despite the reference in international law, have objectively turned into supporters of Serbian and Russian policy in the Balkan region.  Of course, this non-unique position of the EU has been capitalized to the maximum by both Moscow and Belgrade, which have not taken the EU seriously. And as long as the EU does not speak with one voice for Kosovo and throughout the region, necessarily the role of the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy will not be taken seriously either in the region or at the level European and global. EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, Catherine Ashton, said it well at the beginning of her work in the spring of 2010: "The Balkans is the birthplace of EU foreign policy, and it is here that we cannot to allow failure". And the serious test for this, without a doubt, is the Brussels process, which must change in approach and methodology, if it aims at the full normalization of relations between the two small states as the only alternative to close the chapter on difficult conflicts in Southeast Europe. Some concrete and serious steps must be taken:

The first and necessary step in this case would be, not the negotiations for the gradual dismantling of the Ahtisaari Plan (such as self-management, the opening of the chapter on cultural and religious heritage and later the issue of territorial expansion of the municipalities), but talks on the normalization of neighborhood relations. This would mean abandoning the ideas that aim to paralyze the state of Kosovo through the creation of internal obstacle mechanisms. Meanwhile, the attempt through continuous concessions only from the Kosovar side gives us the impression  that in the talks between Kosovo and Serbia in Brussels, it seems that two equal parties are not talking, which they should  lead you  until the solution of neighborhood problems. The Geneva talks in 1992 on the issue of education mediated by the German ambassador Hert Ahrens, after the Rugova-Milosevic Agreement on the normalization of the issue of education (1996), the Rambouillet talks (1999), the Vienna talks on final status (2006-2007) , additional talks of the international trio (Isginger, Wisner, Hartchenko)  and 14 of the Brussels dialogue have resulted in failure. Belgrade has never even been interested in any solution with Kosovo and it is evident that it has always stopped only when it was forced under the threat of using military force.

Second, Kosovo should first be recognized by the five EU countries on the premises of the ICJ opinion, and then a Comprehensive and legally binding Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia should be sought, and not the other way around: once normalization then recognition by the five EU member states. This approach would also make irrelevant the request/need for the recognition of the state of Kosovo by Belgrade, because in this way the Belgrade authorities would give up the desire to maintain a conflicting status quo and thereby any possibility of prolonging the dialogue without borders was taken away. Moreover, the recognition by the five EU countries, which after the opinion of the ICJ have no legal and political argument, would replace the rhetoric of the European perspective for Kosovo with concrete steps towards NATO membership.  EU, OSCE and CIS. And only the fear of its insignificance in the Euro-Atlantic integration of Kosovo and the countries of the region would make the Serbian authorities more rational and cooperative in the Brussels process.

Third, in this difficult geopolitical situation, where the attention of Europe and America is focused on Ukraine and the Middle East, Kosovo should focus on essential issues for its future, such as membership in NATO as soon as possible. It cannot itself ensure stability in a tense regional environment or strengthen its international positions without support from important allies. This implies the need for a new approach to rebuilding trust with Western friends and allies. A more pragmatic approach would be necessary to avoid further erosion of international diplomatic support. In this regard, the West should seriously consider the goal and historical orientation of Kosovo to become part of NATO and other security organizations. Such a strategy is vital for Kosovo and for peace, stability and the Euro-Atlantic future of the region.

(You can read the first part of this article by clicking here)