Even though European countries have become more and more accustomed to relying on the US, the increasingly inward-looking America does not seem to be a source of stability this time around. In the meantime, while cracks are already being seen in Europe's relationship with its neighbors and even between EU countries, China is already ready to use the crack between them and deepen it even more. So, as imperative as it is to win the battle against COVID-19, it is equally important for liberal Europe to win the battle of its narrative
Not only has COVID-19 caused a global public health crisis, it is also accelerating a geopolitical tug-of-war over the narrative and politics of the pandemic. The Balkan states are the last battleground.
On the one hand, the European Union is advancing the agenda of European liberalism and solidarity. And on the other hand, the relatively new actor in the region - China - is making progress and expanding its influence, especially in the new and less consolidated democracies of the Western Balkans, but also in the new ones that are members of the EU. -'s.
Target audience: the hearts and minds of the peoples of Europe.
Obviously, this crisis can be defined in many ways. It is understood as an urgent health issue, both globally and nationally. It is also being interpreted as a global economic crisis, with many analysts drawing analogies to the depression that followed the stock market crash of 1929. And the third key definition concerns the effect of the pandemic on democracies and other political systems. around the world, as well as on the relations between global powers, with special emphasis on the United States of America, the EU and China. Through this definition, conflicting narratives and their political implications in the management of the COVID-19 crisis can be distinguished.
China is struggling to define the public health emergency as something more than a pandemic; is portraying it as a test for states. Proof of efficiency and capacity to deal with the virus. A test in which China, and by extension, authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies are scoring higher than Western liberal democracies. Chinese authorities have advanced a narrative that portrays democracy as inferior to China's authoritarian system of governance. In Chinese textbooks one can come across the claim that multi-party liberal democracy is inadequate, partisan and divisive. In contrast, the Chinese one-party system of government, the narrative continues, is efficient and leaves no room for infighting and populism.
This is not a new idea. One can even go as far as Plato to look for arguments that discredit the ways of managing COVID-19 by liberal democracies. Beijing makes a seemingly convincing argument; most of the worst performing countries are in fact the liberal democracies of the West such as: the United States of America, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. At the same time, many authoritarian states, as well as illiberal or flawed democracies, such as China, Vietnam, and some Balkan states, have proved highly successful in managing the pandemic. Based on their score on the Global Health Security Index, one would expect the Balkan states to have more trouble dealing with this emergency. However, data collected by ELIAMEP's South-Eastern Europe program suggest significantly more efficient management of the crisis, both in terms of cases and deaths.
This troubling thesis provides compelling arguments that support the case for authoritarianism; arguments that the People's Republic of China has routinely used. In addition, China has assisted the states of the Balkan Peninsula and presented itself as a strong and reliable alternative to the EU and the United States.
The EU's initial reluctance to provide its comprehensive assistance could potentially strengthen the voices of those seeking to undermine democracy in the region.
However, there are many reasons why this argument of "authoritarian efficiency" can be seen as a red herring. Maybe here it is not so much about democracy, but more about lame policies. Some states have been slow to react, fearing the electoral punishment of a public still unconvinced of the threat posed by the pandemic. Others have been confident that they can handle the rapid rise in cases, based on their strong economies and sufficient capacity of health systems. Some democracies seem to have paid a high price for not choosing to disturb their liberal values.
However, there are also successful examples, such as Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, which suggest that democratic systems can be made impervious to such risks through reform and preparation.
China's efforts to change the narrative of the crisis and exert influence in Europe with "mask diplomacy" serve to export its ideology: authoritarianism. The new democracies of the Balkans have always been seen as ambivalent towards democracy. The Freedom House index ranks them as only partially free, as the many consequences of the Yugoslav wars are still roiling the political, public spectrum and the lives of their citizens. And China offers sweet deals to any incoming autocrat in the Balkans.
The EU requires compliance with hard-to-fulfill standards for every aspect of governance. Thus, it would be easier for politicians to turn to a new partner, who, obviously, will not be critical of the violation of human rights, will not demand transparency, and perhaps most importantly, has shown willingness to invest heavily for his partners.
In some countries, there is no fertile ground for Chinese influence in any form. The Spanish government, for example, has rejected Chinese "aid". In contrast, there are other countries that have felt abandoned by the EU and the West and appear to be more open. Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Greece and even Italy have received equipment donations and aid from China.
The Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić, has even gone as far as to declare that European Solidarity does not exist and that China is the only country that can help Serbia in condemning the fact that financial aid from the EU was insufficient. In Italy, calls for assistance went unheeded by other member states, as China offered aid to a country where, according to a recent survey, more than 40 percent of the population wants to leave the EU.
One can only speculate on the ultimate intent of Chinese policies. They are usually referred to as an exercise of "soft power" with the aim of securing a terrain around the world and, in the current context, distracting attention from the shortcomings of its own management of the crisis, especially in the Wuhan region. Such policies can also be attributed to its leadership's attempt to elevate its status as a global power to its domestic audience.
In other words, the "diplomacy of masks" and the tarnishing of Western democracy must be coordinated with China's intentions both on the domestic and foreign stage.
However, regardless of whether this is a long-term strategy, China's growing appeal, not only as a reliable economic partner, but more importantly as an alternative model of governance that succeeds where democracy fails, is alarming.
China seems to be causing a rift between the states of Europe. And even worse than that, it is challenging the very ideals of democracy. The connection may be fabricated and the evidence alludes to different findings, but authoritarianism and China continue to be tempting, especially in times of desperation, such as the one recently brought about by COVID-19.
Worrying as it may be, China appears to be winning the battle for ownership of the pandemic narrative. Europe needs to come together to fight the virus.
Even though European countries have become more and more accustomed to relying on the US, the increasingly inward-looking America does not seem to be a source of stability this time around. In the meantime, while cracks are already being seen in Europe's relationship with its neighbors and even between EU countries, China is already ready to use the crack between them and deepen it even more.
So, as imperative as it is to win the battle against COVID-19, it is equally important for liberal Europe to win the battle over its narrative.
(Iakovos Tsalikoglou is a research assistant, while Panagiotis Paschaldis is a research partner in the ELIAMEP Southeast Europe Program. This program has closely monitored all developments related to COVID-19 in any country of the Balkan region. The corresponding project "Balkans COVID -19: Mapping and Response Analyslis” (https://www.eliamep.gr/en/topics/southeast-europe-programme/), was launched in April 2020 and has created an interactive map that is updated on a daily basis with some qualitative and quantitative data. This overview is part of the series of analyzes aimed at expanding the spectrum of the study to influence this urgent situation in the region)
