The new political balance created on February 9: The way forward

The people did not say who is best suited to lead the difficult processes that await us. The popular vote showed that there is a need for dialogue and cooperation between political forces to pave the best way to overcome the difficult processes, which cannot be left in the hands of just one force. Kosovo belongs to everyone, therefore the citizens' verdict of February 9 conveyed the message of cooperation and not domination.

Not even four days after the end of the parliamentary elections on February 9, the Central Election Commission (CEC) has not released the final results. There were technical problems during the vote counting, for which there is still no official explanation from the CEC. Some 80.000 diaspora votes remained uncounted, the administration and transportation of which was also accompanied by problems and suspected violations. So, I can conclude that while the voting day went well, with a high level of culture expressed by the citizens, the state failed to carry out its duties during the electoral process.

Just to mention, I still have a faint mark of the marker, which was used because the paint/spray used to mark the voters also did not work. There is room for accountability from the chairman of the CEC to the leaders of the technical part of this institution. However, given that each vote and each deputy more or less carries weight and can be decisive for the calculation of post-election alliances and coalitions, as long as we do not yet have the final election results, it is still too early to talk about the final options for the formation of governing coalitions.

Therefore, I will try to present a series of options based on the results provided by the CEC so far - with 40.84% ​​won by the Vetëvendosje Movement (LVV), 22.05% by the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), 17.67% by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), 7.45% by the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo-Initiative coalition, 4.55% by the Serbian List and 0.47% for Freedom, Justice and Survival of Nenad Rashiq, which, according to reports, could win one MP out of ten guaranteed for the Serb community. Another ten MPs belong to parties representing other non-majority communities, such as Bosniaks, Turks, Roma, Egyptians, Ashkali. It should be noted from the outset that traditionally, parties of non-majority communities do not play a role in the formation of coalitions. They have always joined the coalition or party that has formed the parliamentary majority. So, the decision on post-election coalitions belongs to the Albanian parties.

There are three main options, if we exclude the conspiracy variant that a number of opposition MPs, more specifically from NISMA, could switch their political camp and give LVV the votes needed to create a narrow parliamentary majority. This conspiracy theory, which I had heard from LVV supporters immediately after the elections, was not denied by NISMA representatives, although it was also spoken about publicly. However, in this article this option will be excluded. Also, if LVV with the votes of the diaspora manages to have 50 MPs, it does not need coalitions with Albanian parties, since it can receive the support of non-majority communities and one Serbian MP, namely Rašić. In this case, we could have a fragile majority that would depend on a single vote and the Serbian List.

In forming an opinion on which option is the best, one must take into account the major political changes in the US and those that could occur in Europe if the far-right "AfD" manages to win the elections in Germany. US policy towards Kosovo and the Balkan region in general will change radically. The Trump administration has no patience to deal with a problem for a long time and has no patience with leaders who do not walk the walk and do not talk the talk. Therefore, Kosovo's policy of these four years will change because it cannot count on the US partnership and its role as the main guarantor of security in Kosovo and the region if the parties do not fully cooperate in resolving the remaining problems. Kosovo may even be presented with difficult conditions and solutions by the Trump administration. If he asks the Canadians, our closest allies, to give up their independence, I can only imagine what could happen in Kosovo. With Trump at the helm, anything is possible. Therefore, politics must be wise, mature, and know how to navigate the international complexity created by Trump's coming to power.

If LVV fails to have enough MPs to form a coalition with the non-majority parties and with Rashiq's party, then the situation changes and the way opens for more political options. I present these below:

Option number 1 is the formation of a unity government, a temporary coalition of all parliamentary political forces that will allow Kosovo to make difficult decisions that await Kosovo in the coming period. This unity government would make the decision on the establishment of the Association of Serb-majority municipalities and would take over the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue until the final agreement, which will likely be requested by the Trump administration. So far, no one has spoken publicly about this type of broad coalition. On the contrary. Prime Minister Kurti has even insulted the opposition parties and their voters with the words “hajvan” and “hajvanat”, thus showing that he does not know how to behave like a winner, with grace and with nur (graciously). People should have grace and nur even when they lose, to know how to accept both defeat and victory. However, in theory this option is possible and could be dissolved with early parliamentary elections in 2026, before the election of the new president.

Option number 2 is a coalition of opposition parties, which together could overtake LVV with the number of MPs won. This option is not easy either, given that all opposition parties aim for the post of prime minister. For this option to be implemented, political parties must make a deal that takes into account the election results. So, with this option, the post of prime minister would have to go to PDK, the post of first deputy prime minister to LDK, while ministerial posts could be negotiated, depending on the responsibility and weight that the different ministries have. These ministries could be reformatted to respond to the demands of opposition parties. If LVV fails to form a majority, this option is entirely possible and would even have international support and over 47% of voters, more than LVV has. A government formed by the opposition requires understanding and agreement as well as confirmation of the readiness to remain part of the coalition and resolve contentious issues that may arise amicably. Of course, part of the negotiations for the formation of a coalition of opposition parties would also be the position of president, who will be elected in 2026. Let us not forget that in the third round, the election of the president does not require more than a majority of 61 votes of the deputies of the Assembly.

Option number three would be for the opposition parties to agree to support the formation of a minority government, led by the LVV. It is a theoretical possibility, but in practice it would be unlikely to be realized and could be a gamble with the future of Kosovo.

Why would there be a reason to vote for a minority government led by the LVV? First, the LVV would take on the burden of completing political processes, such as the establishment of the Association, and would also face a different policy from the Trump administration, in which case many of the party's positions would be invalidated. Moreover, a minority government would allow the opposition to overthrow it before the presidential election and would allow it to systematically show the shortcomings of the LVV's governance. Dependent on the support of the opposition, Kurti would completely change the method of despotic governance that he has exercised in the last four years, since he would be forced to account to parliament.

In conclusion, the result of the parliamentary elections does not provide anyone with a stable parliamentary majority. Even if one of the opposition parties joins the LVV, which is less likely, we will have early parliamentary elections, certainly before the election of Vjosa Osmani's successor or her confirmation for another mandate. During these two years, we will have a fragile majority, the political responsibility of which will be great - one could even call it historic - because we are entering a period that could be decisive for the fate of Kosovo and its citizens.

The people did not say who is best suited to lead the difficult processes that await us. The popular vote showed that there is a need for dialogue and cooperation between political forces to pave the best way to overcome the difficult processes, which cannot be left in the hands of just one force. Kosovo belongs to everyone, therefore the citizens' verdict of February 9 conveyed the message of cooperation and not domination.