Serbia's scorched earth strategy in Kosovo

The German journalist, Erich Rathfelder, considers the Recak massacre of January 15, 1999 not as a surprise, but as an expected development. Through contacts with Serbian sources in Sarajevo, he had understood that Milosevic was preparing to play everything in a single card to realize his vision of changing the ethnic composition of Kosovo. The author sees the Recak massacre as an attempt to expel Albanians from Kosovo, but also as part of a military strategy to control the Pristina-Prizren road, one of the main arteries of the country. With his book “Kosovo – The History of a Conflict” he gives Kosovo a correct voice in history – a voice that must be heard.

The "Horseshoe" Plan and the internationalization of the conflict

Unlike many other international authors – including some Germans – Erich Rathfelder claims that the Serbian scorched earth strategy in Kosovo was part of a structured military plan. According to him, this plan had the shape of the letter “U” turned to the west, which had to be “closed” by Serbian forces to complete the encirclement and cleansing of Kosovo. To close this “U”, the Serbs had to take control of the Prizren-Peć road. The Albanians, on the other hand, had to thwart this goal by building the codenamed “Horseback” military plan in central Kosovo, from where they could then advance north or south to cut off Serbian logistical connections and isolate Belgrade troops in Prizren or Peć.

To implement this strategy, the KLA had to keep the border with Albania open at several key points, defend the town of Junik, and take control of Rahovec. This operational scheme was directly related to the visit of the American envoy, Richard Holbrooke, to Junik in June 1998, in an attempt to open channels of dialogue and to include the KLA in the political process. In this context, Rathfelder speaks of the negotiations with set deadlines, the diplomatic engagement of Holbrooke, Ambassador Christopher Hill, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, and the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade, Wolfgang Petritsch. He also analyzes the role of Security Council resolutions and the debates that began in the West about the need for intervention even without UN authorization, in case of further deterioration of the situation.

This was the moment when Kosovo gained a new dimension of internationalization. Under American pressure, Milosevic agreed to sign an agreement with Holbrooke for the deployment of 2.000 unarmed OSCE observers – an agreement that was also accepted by the KLA. On October 9, 1998, the latter declared a unilateral ceasefire.

The Racak massacre and the failure of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement

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Rathfelder considers the Recak massacre of January 15, 1999, not as a surprise, but as an expected development. Through contacts with Serbian sources in Sarajevo, he had understood that Milosevic was preparing to play everything on a single card to realize his vision of changing the ethnic composition of Kosovo.

The author sees the Recak massacre as an attempt to expel Albanians from Kosovo, but also as part of a military strategy to control the Pristina-Prizren road, one of the country's main arteries.

“According to Serbian military doctrine, the special forces acted according to protocol: first they hit the village with artillery, then they entered, searched for people who had not managed to escape, separated the men from the women and children, sent the men to another location and shot them – just like in Bosnia,” Rathfelder writes.

The Racak massacre also marks the failure of the OSCE mission and the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. This crime shocked international opinion and was the catalyst for the beginning of NATO intervention.

Rambouillet Conference – lost window of compromise

The Rambouillet Conference is presented as a key moment in international efforts to stop the escalation of violence and avoid a full-scale war in Kosovo. In his book “Kosovo – the history of a conflict”, the German journalist Erich Rathfelder devotes an in-depth and critical analysis to this conference, describing it as the decisive point where international diplomacy failed to prevent military intervention.

In his distinctive and engaging style, Rathfelder offers a clear picture of the negotiations and internal dynamics that characterized Rambouillet, interpreting it as a “lost window of compromise” on the part of Slobodan Milošević. For him, the Serbian refusal was not simply a political act, but part of a deliberate strategy to prepare for the campaign of ethnic cleansing that would follow.

He exposes the Serbian narrative of a “planned NATO invasion” as a propaganda maneuver intended to legitimize the rejection of the agreement and mobilize domestic Serbian opinion. For Rathfelder, Rambouillet was not a failure of the West to impose peace, but an opportunity rejected by the Serbian regime – an act that inevitably led to NATO intervention.

The purpose of the Rambouillet Conference, according to the author, was conceived as a model similar to Dayton: Albanian and Serbian representatives would isolate themselves in a castle near Paris until a compromise was reached. The international mediators – including Albright, Holbrooke, Hill, Cook, Védrine and Petritsch – aimed for a balanced agreement that would stop the war and ensure a NATO presence to enforce it.

Rathfelder notes that the Serbian delegation at Rambouillet was weak and unrepresentative, consisting mainly of deputies and low-ranking figures, which clearly showed that Milosevic was not interested in a political solution. On the contrary, as the talks dragged on, he was amassing troops and weapons in Kosovo, preparing the ground for a new offensive. The book emphasizes that the Rambouillet agreement did not violate the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. Serbia still retained many powers over Kosovo, while for the Albanians it represented a painful compromise: the dissolution of the KLA was required, while the final status was postponed until later. However, the agreement provided for extensive self-government and the presence of NATO forces as guarantors of security – key issues for the Albanians. One of the most controversial elements was the so-called “military annex”, which guaranteed NATO complete freedom of action on the territory of Yugoslavia. Rathfelder explains that this annex was used by Serbian propaganda as an excuse to reject the agreement, while Western critics saw it as evidence of NATO’s hegemonic intentions. However, drawing on Jens Reuter’s analysis, the author argues that this annex was not the subject of real negotiations and was taken mechanically from the Dayton agreement – ​​more as a technical model than as a real goal for occupation.

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Clashes within the Albanian delegation

Rathfelder sheds light on the tensions and hesitations within the Albanian delegation, especially the stance of Hashim Thaçi, who initially refused to sign. The majority of the KLA was in favor of the agreement, but Thaçi was hesitant. Only after great pressure from international diplomats and a warning from Madeleine Albright that NATO would not intervene without a signature did the Albanian delegation sign the agreement on March 18, 1999.

Serbia, on the other hand, refused to sign the agreement, continuing military preparations in Kosovo. This refusal, together with the intensification of repression against Albanians, ultimately led to the beginning of NATO bombing on 24 March 1999. The internationalization of the Kosovo conflict and the 78-day NATO bombing of Serbian military targets led to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and police from Kosovo and its placement under international civilian and military supervision. The entry of NATO ground troops paved the way for efforts by the OSCE, UNMIK and the European Union to build functional administrative structures in Kosovo.

Rathfelder offers a profound, often critical and uncompromising analysis of this important chapter in Kosovo's modern history. He highlights that initially the presence of KFOR with over 50 troops created a sense of security and hope among the citizens of Kosovo, who had just experienced a campaign of ethnic cleansing. In parallel, UNMIK took over the management of institutions and public life.

Rathfelder carefully analyzes the complex and bureaucratic structure of

UNMIK, noting that it consisted of several different components: the UN civil administration, the OSCE for building democratic institutions, the EU for economic reconstruction, and the UNHCR for the return of displaced persons. This four-pillar structure, according to him, never managed to create a clear command, effective hierarchy, and long-term vision for the institutional development of Kosovo.

One of the strongest criticisms that Rathfelder articulates is that of the international elite of UNMIK, who, according to him, after 2003 became part of a privileged structure and disconnected from the reality of the Kosovar people. He describes them as “officials satisfied with high salaries and life in Pristina”, who often showed a lack of will to face the real challenges of the country, including building the rule of law, the return of Serb displaced persons, fighting corruption and building a functional local administration. The author also emphasizes that because of this gap, many political decisions remained in the hands of internationals, while Kosovar leaders often appeared more as local managers of an imported power than as true bearers of sovereignty. He highlights, for example, that UNMIK, instead of preparing the ground for a rapid transfer of powers to the locals, often delayed these processes with vague justifications. After the declaration of independence in 2008, the EU mission EULEX replaced part of UNMIK's role, but according to Rathfelder, this mission also inherited many of the previous problems: political uncertainty, lack of legitimacy in the northern part of Kosovo, and competition between international actors.

A voice that must be heard, preserved and studied

The book “Kosovo – The History of a Conflict” by Erich Rathfelder is one of the most important and authentic works that comprehensively documents the Kosovo issue at the end of the 20th century and in the first decade of the 21st century. Its importance lies not only in the fact that it was written by a direct witness to the events, but also in its critical, impartial and in-depth approach to local and international actors. Rathfelder does not present just a journalistic account, but offers an interconnected analysis of the political, military and diplomatic developments that led Kosovo to liberation and then to independence. He helps the reader understand that the history of Kosovo is not simply local history, but part of the European political and moral conscience, in which the values ​​of justice, responsibility and international intervention in the protection of endangered peoples collide.

The book “Kosovo – The History of a Conflict” by the German journalist, Erich Rathfelder, represents an important and irreplaceable contribution to the contemporary historiography of Kosovo. Written by a direct witness to the political and military developments from the late 80s until the declaration of independence in 2008, this book constitutes a balanced, documented and profound account of the causes, dynamics and consequences of the Kosovo conflict in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. With truthfulness, honesty and analytical courage, Rathfelder gives Kosovo an accurate voice in history – a voice that should be heard, preserved and studied.

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