Kurti's 19-ministerial government 3: State expansion or control expansion?

If an ad hoc analysis from the aspect of organizational sociology (Weber, Crozier) were required for the Kurti 3 government, it could undoubtedly be qualified as an institutionalist structure designed for formal pluralist purposes, with strategically centralist impressions and nuances, then with completely leftist ideological ambitions, goals and motives that belong to a more moderate spectrum, as well as as a structure that is still in the process of self-searching to install a project identified politically as the "Third Republic" of Kosovo.

But what in fact is this project that co-emerge with the VV, or with its creator, inspirer and articulator, Albin Kurti? If we first try to substantiate each of the aforementioned formalist goals, we will much better understand both the motives and the commitments for the future of Kosovo with the VV and with Albin Kurti. With this methodology, we will also be able to understand the parameters of the compatibility of this projection with the processes and developments of the dynamics of a crisis that has appeared not only to us, but to the entire world.

Let's see in turn, because all these sociological references, in a way, are formulas that describe the very reconfiguration of states and countries that are still under the "fever of transition".

When it comes to formal pluralist goals, our allusion aims to conceptualize, in a more or less illustrative way, the megalomaniac construct of ministries, along with the distribution of competencies and the engagement that should occur within the framework of this political process. Viewed with this lens, this process, starting from the act of appointment to the beginning of taking on actual responsibilities, is leaving a diverse and decentralized impression. But whether this goal and this ambition of the Kurti 3 government will also happen in real life, remains to be seen when the de facto “activation” of energies for engagement begins, where transparency, accountability and responsibility, in my judgment, should be the standards and parameters of (non)success.

To better understand the government offer that was made in the Assembly, we need to look at the typology selected for the ways and alternatives for how decisions of a capital nature for the state and the country will be made. We say this because from the experiences of all post-war governments we have noticed that strategic agendas for the country were almost always determined mainly by the prime minister's office or the prime minister's office, where the relevant ministries and departments never functioned as autonomous actors, but only as blind implementers of the election winner. This means that all capital development investments for the state of Kosovo had necessarily passed through a centralized political filter.

Expressed in Weberian “language”: the state and the country were not led, or to put it euphemistically, were not managed through a “formal bureaucratic rationality”, but mainly through a charismatic authority. Here it is worth recalling the governing mandates of the post-war “commanders”, along with the “pacifists”.

Another element that characterizes the organizational structure of the Kurti 3 government cabinet is the ideological motivation with moderate priorities, where ministries should not appear simply as technical or managerial “offices”, but substantively as public political offers, where sovereignty, social justice, the fight against corruption and state reforms should become central themes of everyday life. From what we saw in the Assembly, it seems that we will not only have routine administration, but the beginning of a commitment to a new political project, which Mr. Albin Kurti has identified as the “Third Republic”. This project is identified in political sociology as a government that takes on more of a normative mission than a technical role.

The main challenge of this project, which we are saying is not so much technical as normative, is the real state capacity, where I do not believe that the current public administration will have neither the willingness nor the adequate preparation to carry out the idea of ​​the “Third Republic”. This is also for a simple reason: the current administration of Kosovo, which has over 93.000 employees, unlike Slovenia, which is similar in geography and demographics, manages the state with three times fewer resources, that is, with about 30.000 administrators.

If the political project that the Kurti 3 government is offering is not as clear as claimed, and when considering that the current institutions are fragile and overloaded, with mixed competencies, full of political burdens and an evident lack of a European institutional culture, then the issue of radical reform turns out to be a Sisyphean task.

Returning to the topic of ministries, it should be emphasized that increasing the state structure to 19 ministries should not be simply an organizational issue, because the large number of departments is a typical characteristic of leftist governments.

This increase in ministries, apart from the ambitions to systematize the coalition allies, who in the case of VV, without the charisma of Albin Kurti would be irrelevant in the Kosovar political scene, can also be interpreted as a tendency to expand the "Weberian" bureaucracy, which usually imposes a higher vertical control than horizontal. Such an increase also creates an environment of fragmentation of competencies, which Prime Minister Kurti can use to avoid internal rivalry during the compilation of names that have already become de facto and de jure the main bearers and responsible.

In the case of Kosovo, where the experience of a typical bureaucratic government, but also the culture of responsibility, transparency and accountability is still lacking, it is quite difficult to impose a successful political management of power, let alone an institutional rationalization. This is also because when the state is led by charismatic figures, it is very difficult to functionalize the Weberian concept of “bureaucracy”, where transparency and hierarchical accountability operate without a strong decision-making center.

Such a situation creates the paradox where formally we have an institutional pluralism, while in real life a strategic center of authority that decides everything. This combination is typical of the so-called “plebiscitary democracy” models (Weber), where the leader relies directly on electoral legitimacy, while the cabinet takes on a more operational than political role.

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As emphasized at the beginning, this project with doses of the "Third Republic" installation brings us to the million-dollar question: are we dealing with the production of policies or the production of symbols, which the opposition has often called "optical" deceptions?

This question, in my opinion, cannot receive a quick and adequate answer. It remains to be confirmed or denied only during or after the end of the Kurti 3 governing mandate. In the meantime, I believe that the opposition should not fall into resignation but should impose itself as very effective and vigilant, in case it intends to enter into (un)loyal competition with the most powerful post-war government. It should make its opposition commitment by taking care of and following "step by step" every wrong step that is detrimental to statehood on the part of the government. Because, this is what the neoliberal democracy of the time itself demands.