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Yuri Panchenko
- August 15, 2026 14:06
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What was the meaning of Zelensky's visit, given that Vučić, a day earlier, clearly stated that Serbia's position on not joining sanctions against Russia remains unchanged? The way the visit took place shows that both sides needed it and there is reason to believe that they fulfilled their objectives.
Yuri Panchenko (European Pravda/Ukrainska Pravda)
"I am grateful to the Ukrainian president for the support he is giving us on our path to Europe. I want to tell the citizens that you will never hear a single bad word about Serbia from Volodymyr Zelensky. And for that I am very grateful," declared Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić - the leader of the most Russia-friendly state in Europe - during a joint appearance with journalists.
The visit of the Ukrainian president to Belgrade looks truly sensational. This was Volodymyr Zelensky's first visit to Serbia. Moreover, it lasted two days – on Friday, August 7, Aleksandar Vučić hosted an informal dinner for his Ukrainian counterpart, while all official events took place the next day.
Such a format usually highlights particularly close relations between countries and their leaders. But is there really any reason to say that relations between Ukraine and Serbia are like that?
And, in general, what was the meaning of this visit for Volodymyr Zelensky, given that Vučić, the day before, clearly emphasized that Serbia's position on not joining sanctions against Russia remains unchanged?
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However, the way the visit took place shows that it was necessary for both leaders.
And there is reason to believe that both sides achieved their objectives.
Serbia – Russia's ally, or not entirely?
Who is today's Serbia partnering with? At first glance, the answer seems clear: Belgrade's relations with Moscow are extremely close. Not even Hungary during Orban's time has shown such obvious closeness to the Kremlin.
Last year, Aleksandar Vučić even traveled to Moscow to attend the May 9 military parade. Serbia is not only one of the last buyers of Russian gas in Europe, but it has no intention of giving it up.
Despite its EU candidate status, Serbia did not join the sanctions against Russia and even continues to maintain – and has increased compared to the pre-war period – direct flights to Moscow. For this reason, the country has become a “window to Europe” for those Russians who manage to obtain Schengen visas.
After all, according to Eurobarometer data, 71% of Serbs have a positive attitude towards Russia.
But, despite this image, Vučić has had close contacts and cooperation with Kiev.
These contacts have become particularly public recently. Last year, he visited Odessa for the “Ukraine – Southeast Europe” summit. In July of this year, he visited Kiev to participate in a similar event.
And although Serbia both times refused to sign the declarations of these summits, which contain the condemnation of Russian aggression and the call for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, the very fact of the increasingly close contacts of the Serbian authorities with Kiev irritates the Kremlin no less.
There have been a number of other, publicly reported visits. The Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk, visited Belgrade, followed by the then Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, Taras Kachka. Against this background, Volodymyr Zelensky's arrival in Serbia was a logical continuation of the efforts for rapprochement.
However, the question remains: why did Volodymyr Zelensky need such a visit?
Especially in the context of the fact that a day earlier Vučić had again stated that Serbia's position on not joining EU sanctions against Russia remains unchanged.
The official agenda – mutual support for EU membership, Serbia's participation in Ukraine's post-war reconstruction, and economic cooperation – does not answer this question.
Ukraine and Serbia have also resumed negotiations on the creation of a free trade zone and plan to conclude them early next year. But this is clearly not an issue that required discussion at the highest level.
For Kiev, this visit is important for at least two reasons.
First of all, it is a psychological blow to Russia.
It is worth recalling that Volodymyr Zelensky's visit to Armenia in June – a country that until recently was one of Russia's most loyal allies – was perceived in Moscow as evidence of the significant decline of Russian influence in the South Caucasus region.
In the same way, the current visit to Belgrade shows the decline of Russian influence in the Western Balkans region as well.
"The fact that Putin's greatest enemy is now coming for an official visit to Serbia also allows us to draw some conclusions about Serbian expectations... The leadership in Belgrade, it seems, does not have the impression that Putin's forces are close to a decisive victory in Ukraine in the short term," the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) comments on this visit.
But the other, even more important reason is the arms negotiations.
The guarantor of the supply of "Soviet" shells to the Armed Forces of Ukraine
It is worth remembering that, despite repeated statements by the Serbian leadership that Belgrade does not sell military-grade products to Ukraine, in fact the supply of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with Serbian ammunition has never ceased.
Formally, Serbia sells them to various EU countries, but no one has any doubts about who the ultimate beneficiary is.
According to the US ambassador to Serbia during 2022–2025, Christopher Hill, Serbia's readiness to de facto supply Ukraine with the entire necessary range of ammunition and, at the same time, to guarantee that it would not sell military products to Russia was much more important than agreeing to be "a statistic in a sanctions regime that would hardly change anything in the overall situation."
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"Of course, everyone in Belgrade who was involved knew that countries like Poland or the Czech Republic were not the final consumers of the weapons. But, of course, these deals did not remain a secret for the Russian side. This is evidenced by several public warnings by the Russian intelligence services to Vučić," Hill said.
An important element is that Serbia produces ammunition for Soviet-caliber weapons, which are very rare in Europe. They were especially needed by Kiev during the first years of the war.
But now the need for them has increased again – after the new Bulgarian government announced a ban on military aid to Ukraine. It is currently unknown whether Sofia will also ban commercial supplies of ammunition – including Soviet calibers. However, Ukraine decided to secure itself.
Therefore, one of the main tasks of the visit was to obtain guarantees from the Serbian authorities to maintain the current ammunition sales scheme and, if necessary, increase sales.
However, the aforementioned FAZ published information before the visit that, in addition, the parties planned to discuss the construction of a drone production plant in Serbia. But this scenario seems too fantastic – Kiev is hardly ready to transfer sensitive technologies to a country that still maintains a close level of cooperation with Russia.
Finally, after negotiations with Zelensky, Aleksandar Vučić specifically emphasized that no joint defense projects would be considered until the end of the war.
It should also be added that, on issues related to the status of Kosovo, Vučić did not receive anything new – Zelensky actually reiterated Ukraine’s long-standing position on recognizing Serbia’s territorial integrity. However, this caused a harsh reaction from the Kosovo authorities. (European Pravda has published separate articles on this issue).
Risks in exchange for rapprochement with the EU
Given this, the question arises: what did Volodymyr Zelensky's visit bring to the Serbian authorities?
After all, parliamentary and presidential elections will soon be held in Serbia, and in this context, Volodymyr Zelensky's visit is not at all favorable from an electoral point of view. Among voters of the current government, the absolute majority have a positive attitude towards Russia.
Not to mention the fact that such a visit gives the pro-Russian opposition a very suitable topic for harsh criticism.
"The decision of the Serbian president to invite the head of the Kiev regime to Serbia could cause the country incalculable national harm, as it could permanently damage relations with a country that is the unwavering defender of Serbia's territorial integrity in the UN Security Council, as well as the constitutional position of Republika Srpska under Dayton," said an open letter published before Volodymyr Zelensky's visit, signed by a hundred opposition politicians and public figures with pro-Russian positions.
These concerns affected preparations for the visit. For example, pro-government media outlets barely reported on the Ukrainian president's arrival.
So, for what reason did Aleksandar Vučić take these risks?
The answer is very simple – in Belgrade they hope that this will help improve relations with the EU, which for Vučić are extremely important.
For many years, Serbian authorities were protected from harsh EU criticism and financial sanctions by President Vučić's close friend, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. But now, after the change of power in Hungary, Serbia has faced a tougher stance from Brussels. This has already led to the freezing of financial aid.
It is for this reason that the Serbian authorities have now taken a course towards improving relations with the EU. While Volodymyr Zelensky's visit should give them an argument that, despite refusing to impose sanctions against Russia, Serbia is acting within the framework of the general European course of supporting Ukraine.
The demonstrative rapprochement between Serbia and Ukraine does not solve the fundamental problems – especially the attacks on democracy and the judicial system, because of which the EU has refused to open new chapters for Serbia. However, stopping the deterioration of the European perspective and, perhaps, improving to some extent the attitude towards Vučić in some European capitals – is entirely possible.
Many Serbian political scientists already predict that, thanks to the invitation to Zelensky, Vučić hopes to "mitigate" potential criticism from the EU.
"This visit may influence, at least partially, some governments of Western countries, so that they refrain from overly open criticism or remain silent about some undemocratic actions of the Vucic regime," predicts Dragan Popovic, director of the Serbian Center for Practical Politics.
And this argument is extremely important for Kiev. It shows that Belgrade could not refuse requests for continued arms supplies and must fulfill the commitments made.
Ultimately, these sales are beneficial not only for Serbia itself, but above all for the people close to Vučić who control the country's defense industry.
Moreover, as Dragan Popović points out, the current changes in foreign policy course do not necessarily lead to the loss of the electorate – as President Vučić tries to position himself as a politician “who pursues a balanced policy towards great powers, similar to what Tito once pursued.”
It should be explained that during the time of Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia was the least pro-Soviet country of the socialist bloc, constantly flirting with the West and benefiting from this economic dividends.
Precisely for this reason, for many Serbs, Tito's time seems like a "golden age," and it is precisely this stereotype that Vučić is trying to exploit to gain support for the gradual reversal of Serbia's foreign policy course.
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While for us it is important that this turn leads to the weakening of dependence on Russia.
The article was published in “European Pravda”, a section specializing in Ukrainian foreign policy, relations with the EU and European affairs, within “Ukrainska Pravda”, which is one of the most popular and influential media outlets in Ukraine. KOHA has published this article in agreement with “Ukrainska Pravda”. Link to the original article:
