Kosovo on the brink of a supercycle of political crisis

If the Constitutional Court does not overturn the decree dissolving the Assembly and does not impose an interim measure regarding the challenge to the decree and the progress of the session to elect the president, which would suspend the legal and constitutional deadlines for setting the election date, the country is expected to go to early elections no later than April 19. Such an electoral calendar would put the opposition spectrum under almost unbearable time pressure.

Kosovo could enter a period of political instability, a kind of cyclical political and electoral crisis that, if not curbed with political prudence, risks producing successive elections without a lasting solution.

If the Constitutional Court does not overturn the decree dissolving the Assembly and does not impose an interim measure regarding the challenge to the decree and the progress of the session to elect the president, which would suspend the legal and constitutional deadlines for setting the election date, the country is expected to go to early elections no later than April 19. Such an electoral calendar would put the opposition spectrum under almost unbearable time pressure. The deadline for new political alignments, pre-election agreements and strategic configurations practically closes around March 29 - an extremely narrow window for serious political calculations and for building alliances with electoral weight.

In such a scenario, the fragmentation of the competition is expected to penalize each opposition force separately. Parties will enter the elections competing not only with the government, but also with each other for the same opposition electorate.

In this configuration, the Democratic Party of Kosovo will most likely maintain the second position on the political scene. Meanwhile, the Democratic League of Kosovo and the new political formation are expected to compete for the third place, further fragmenting the opposition space. The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, if it decides to run alone, faces a real risk of not passing the electoral threshold, a development that would suit the winning party of the elections and could place it outside the Assembly for the first time since 2001.

The biggest challenge, however, lies with the new political formation. Within an extremely short period, it must fulfill several fundamental organizational and institutional tasks: resigning from the Presidency, formally establishing a civic initiative, preparing a list of 110 candidates with a public and professional profile, and building functional structures on the ground.

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Registration as a civic initiative is not just a procedural formality; it is a prerequisite for campaign financing. The electoral legislation is clear: without this legal status, funds from donors cannot be accepted. Without financing, a serious electoral campaign is practically impossible.
Consequently, without a complete list of candidates, without sufficient financial resources, and without an organizational network on the ground, it is extremely difficult to consolidate a new political entity with real capacity to cross the five percent threshold in the remaining time.

Against this backdrop, two main political configurations seem most likely in the opposition camp.
The first scenario would see the Democratic Party of Kosovo compete on its own, while the Democratic League of Kosovo, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, and the new political formation align themselves in a joint opposition bloc. Only in such a configuration is there a possibility that the PDK could risk falling to third place.

The second scenario would involve a pre-election coalition between PDK and AAK, facing an axis composed of LDK and the new political formation. In any other configuration, whether through a separate competition of opposition parties or through a coalition of PDK with AAK, the second position for PDK remains relatively guaranteed.

Meanwhile, the Vetëvendosje Movement continues to enjoy a structural advantage over the opposition. This advantage stems not only from its position of power, but from its ability to articulate a coherent political narrative, from its consolidated party organization, and from a broad social coalition that still supports it.

Even in a scenario of declining popular support in the possible April elections, it is difficult to imagine Vetëvendosje falling below the 40 percent threshold. Such a result would allow it to reproduce the current opposition strategy: blocking the election of the president and, consequently, pushing the country towards a new electoral cycle.

This shifts the essence of the crisis from the electoral dimension to the political one. And since March 6, the crisis in Kosovo is no longer just political; it has also taken on a clear constitutional dimension.
Under these circumstances, new elections or the continuation of the work of the current legislature or those that may follow after the elections do not guarantee a solution if there is no agreement between parliamentary parties on the election of the new president.

Without such a compromise, each election cycle risks producing the same result: a fragmented Parliament and an institutional gridlock that pushes the country towards another election.

This is precisely what could plunge Kosovo into a supercycle of repeated political and electoral crises, a spiral fueled not by the need for institutional stability, but by the logic of personal rivalries, individual egos for political accommodation, and narrow party calculations.

Therefore, the current moment demands political prudence and institutional responsibility. The alternative to this prudence is an endless cycle of crises, in which elections produce only more elections, but not sustainable governance, institutional stability, or the advancement of citizens' interests.

The author served as Chief of Staff to the President of Kosovo (2021-2023) and holds a PhD in Contemporary European Studies from the University of Sussex.