Could the European Confederation be an initiative that strengthens the security and prosperity of the Balkans?

The European Confederation aims to fill the gaps that have been created, without replacing either the EU or NATO. It would be a third European structure, institutionally independent, but in close partnership with both. In this sense, it is not an alternative to European integration, but a way to expand Europe's political, economic and security space beyond the borders of the EU.

The European Confederation proposed by Nick Boles, a former British Conservative MP and former minister in the Cameron government, in an essay published by Demos in early August 2026, could become one of the most important ideas for the political architecture of Europe in the 21st century. Although, if it does not materialize, it may remain another intellectual exercise on the shelves of think tanks in London. British Prime Minister Andy Burnham is expected to consider it as a proposal that could become the official position of the United Kingdom in the recalibration of relations with the European Union after Brexit.

The success of such an initiative will depend on three preconditions: the willingness of the EU and other European states to accept a new institutional architecture, Britain's capacity to provide credible security guarantees, and, above all, the ability of non-EU states, including the Western Balkans, to seize this strategic moment.

The significance of the proposal lies in the attempt to create a new political space between full EU membership and loose diplomatic association. This space exists in part through the European Political Community (EPC), in which Kosovo and the Western Balkan countries have been participating since the inaugural summit in Prague in October 2022. Boles proposes that this platform evolve into a more robust, treaty-based structure that combines access to the Common Market for goods, cooperation in technology and innovation, opportunities for young people and security guarantees modeled on NATO’s Articles 4 and 5, including discussion of extending British nuclear protection to Europe.

In return, free movement, eurozone or Schengen membership would not be automatically required for European states that are members of the Confederation but not of the EU. For the Western Balkans, this could create a complementary framework for deeper European integration. This can only be achieved if the region sees it not as a waiting room, but as a political project in which it is ready to take on obligations.

Confederation as a response to the new international order

To understand the importance of this idea, one must look at the changing strategic environment of Europe. For eight decades after World War II, the European order has rested on three pillars: NATO for security, the EU for prosperity, and the transatlantic relationship for stability. The war in Ukraine, uncertainty about future American engagement, and political fatigue from enlargement have called into question the sustainability of this architecture.

The European Confederation aims to fill the gaps that have been created, without replacing either the EU or NATO. It would be a third European structure, institutionally independent, but in close partnership with both. In this sense, it is not an alternative to European integration, but a way to expand Europe's political, economic and security space beyond the borders of the EU.

The idea has historical precedent. French President François Mitterrand proposed the creation of a European Confederation in 1989 and promoted it together with Václav Havel in Prague in 1991. After the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the concept was revived by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta as a “second circle” of European organization, while the EU would remain the core.

In a more subdued form, then-French President Emmanuel Macron materialized the same logic through the EPC in 2022. The Boles Confederation represents the next step: the transformation of a consultative forum into a treaty-based body with concrete economic and security functions.

Strategic void and opportunities for the Balkans

From reading Boles' proposal, however, a clear limitation emerges: the Western Balkans are mentioned on several occasions and mostly superficially, but their specific interests are not treated with the same level of detail as those of Britain, Ukraine, or the EU.

This is a weakness of the proposal, but also an opportunity for the region. If the Balkan countries want to be more than formal participants, they must determine for themselves what they are looking for: what economic benefits, what security guarantees, what institutional representation, and what obligations they are willing to assume.

The region has long been caught between two realities. The EU continues to present membership as the ultimate destination, but enlargement is slow, technically burdensome, and politically exposed to vetoes and enlargement fatigue. Regional initiatives, meanwhile, have largely advanced economic cooperation without addressing the fundamental question: how does the Balkans become part of Europe’s political and security architecture in the new geostrategic environment?

The confederation could address this gap. It could give the region broader access to the European goods market, technology and research networks, opportunities for young people and, most importantly, a formal role in discussions on European security and defense planning.

This would mean moving from the binary “in or out of the EU” model to a model of gradual integration. For countries in the region whose accession negotiations are slow or blocked by bilateral vetoes, this could be particularly important.

But gradual integration makes sense only if it is accompanied by real contributions. The Balkans cannot claim a greater role in European security without providing functioning democratic institutions, secure borders, reliable infrastructure, interoperable armed forces and predictable legal systems. The aim should be to shift the perception of the region from a problem to be managed to one of a contributor to European security, stability and growth.

The risk of creating a two-tier Europe

The region should welcome the idea, but also view it realistically. The main risk is that Europe's "second circle" will transform from a transitory mechanism into a permanent peripheral status.

For this reason, membership in the Confederation should not become a substitute for the EU enlargement process. On the contrary, it should accelerate convergence with the EU. The path to full membership should remain open, politically credible and supported by a clear legal framework.

Equally important is representation. If Balkan states are expected to harmonise legislation, contribute financially and take on responsibilities in the security field, they must have a voice in the structures that draft the rules. This does not necessarily require identical voting or veto rights with EU member states on topics covered by the EU, but it does require formal consultation, early access to draft acts, joint working groups and transparent mechanisms for resolving disputes.

The principle should be simple: there can be no responsibility without representation, and there can be no representation without responsibility.

Without this balance, the Confederation risks reproducing one of the oldest criticisms of the European integration process: that peripheral countries implement rules that are set elsewhere. This would feed precisely the political forces at both extremes of the political poles that oppose European integration.

What should the Balkans demand?

Western Balkan governments must now begin to define their interests and red lines, individually and, where possible, as a joint regional platform.

This is not the first attempt to overcome the binary model of membership. In February 2026, Edi Rama and Aleksandar Vučić proposed in a joint editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung a model of “accelerated integration”, which would allow Balkan countries access to the Common Market and Schengen without full membership. The idea was met with reservations, partly because it was perceived as an attempt to obtain the benefits of integration without fulfilling all its conditions.

Bole's proposal differs in one essential respect: it aims to create a new treaty-based organization, with legally defined rights and obligations, not bypassing the conditions of membership.

However, access to the goods market alone is not enough. The Balkan economies are increasingly dependent on services, technology, tourism, transport, finance and professional work. The region should also seek integration in digital and services trade, recognition of professional qualifications, secure data flows, the European energy market, payment systems, cross-border transport, public procurement and European value chains.

Otherwise, access to the goods market risks producing only a formal integration, maintaining dependence on low-value production and labor migration. The aim should be sector-by-sector integration, with measurable steps and transitional agreements.

Kosovo and the possibilities of strategic redefinition

For Kosovo, the Confederation could create a unique opportunity: participation in a European structure with the potential to strengthen its international position. The EPC has already proven that this is possible. Kosovo has participated as an equal member of this forum even though five EU countries and Serbia do not recognize its independence.

A treaty-based Confederation could formalize this model, giving Kosovo access to European markets and security mechanisms without requiring recognition or EU membership to occur beforehand.

But the potential consequences of the redefinition of the US role in Europe may force Kosovo to reorder its strategic partnerships. American support has been essential before, during and after the war, as well as after the declaration of independence. However, if the US military presence and political support in Europe changes, Kosovo should deepen ties with European powers that have an interest and capacity for its security, especially the UK, Germany and Turkey, as well as with regional partners such as Albania, Croatia and Bulgaria.

Geography does not give Kosovo the luxury of pursuing a policy based on a single alliance, when its main partner may have a reduced role and less interest in acting on the European continent, expecting European countries to shoulder the role of facilitator for security and stability in Europe. It must build several layers of security with middle European powers that have a strategic interest in the region. The confederation can provide the institutional framework for this redefinition, but only if Kosovo enters it as a contributing partner, and not just as a client seeking protection.

The debate on the European Confederation could be the beginning of a broader reconceptualization of Europe. But it should not be seen solely as a project of London, Brussels or Paris. For the countries of the Western Balkans, the challenge is not to wait for others to define their place in this architecture.

The region must become part of this debate from the outset with concrete demands, but also with a willingness to take responsibility. It must demand access to markets, security, and representation, but in exchange for reforms, financial contributions, and measurable responsibilities in security and governance.

For the first time in a long time, the region may have the opportunity to stop waiting in Europe’s waiting room. But to do so, it must claim its place at the table and be willing to bring something of value with it. It must prove that it is capable of contributing, not just benefiting.

(The author is a visiting research fellow at UTSYN - Centre for Security and Sustainability in Oslo and holds a PhD in Contemporary European Studies from the University of Sussex.