Will KFOR protect Kosovo?

Although Kosovo is important for European peace and security, KFOR has not responded effectively to Serbia's increasingly aggressive actions. KFOR must change its strategy before it is too late.

Serbia’s aggressive rhetoric and military activity – both kinetic and hybrid – have intensified significantly in recent years; as a result, Kosovo’s security is now threatened to a level not seen since 1999. KFOR is key to deterring Serbian aggression, but there are considerable doubts about its capacity and willingness to do so.

Increased Serbian aggression

A series of incidents in recent years illustrate the seriousness of Serbia’s actions. In May 2023, KFOR troops were attacked by Kosovo Serbs protesting the election of Albanian mayors in four northern Kosovo municipalities. A month later, three Kosovo Police officers were abducted by Serbian police inside Kosovo and taken to Serbia. In July of that year, Alicia Kearns, MP and chair of the UK Foreign Affairs Committee, warned that British troops had observed weapons being smuggled into Orthodox monasteries in northern Kosovo from Serbia; although KFOR denied this, two months later, heavily armed Serbs in uniform attacked Kosovo police in Banjska, killing one policeman, before hiding in an Orthodox monastery. The Serbian government declared a day of mourning for the three slain attackers, while the group’s leader – Milan Radoicic, a close associate of President Vucic – remains at large, although he has admitted his direct involvement. The weapons used by the attackers were provided by Serbia, and the Kosovo government has uncovered numerous weapons caches since the attack.
In November 2024, Serbian attackers carried out what the EU described as a “terrorist attack” on a water canal in Zubin Potok in northern Kosovo. The Kosovo Police Director and the Minister of Internal Affairs revealed in September that Kosovo’s airspace had been violated by drones suspected of entering from Serbia, while last month, Serbian gendarmerie wounded a Kosovo Serb known for his stances against the Belgrade-controlled Serbian List and abducted him in Serbia.
During this period, President Vučić and many other top ministers have repeatedly claimed that the Kosovo government has engaged in “ethnic cleansing of the Serbian people” without any evidence.
All of this clearly shows that the risk of a Crimea-style intervention by Serbia is very real. In response to protests against their authoritarian regime, Serbia’s leaders may try to unify the population around a fabricated crisis in Kosovo. Indeed, the attack in Banjska could be seen as a poorly camouflaged attempt to create the conditions for Serbia to send forces to “protect” ethnic Serbs.

KFOR's failures

Many have argued that KFOR’s presence guarantees Kosovo’s security; KFOR has a mandate to prevent “renewal of hostilities” and create “a secure environment,” but its response to increased Serbian aggression so far raises doubts about its willingness to do so.
While KFOR intervened in the face of Serbian mobs that caused unrest in northern Kosovo in May 2023 – suffering consequences in the process – the response to other incidents suggests a clear lack of will to respond appropriately and publicly acknowledge the real nature of the threat to Kosovo. Arms smuggling from Serbia to Kosovo continues and Serbian forces now operate with near impunity inside Kosovo. KFOR is clearly failing to achieve the core objectives of its mandate.
The increase in KFOR troops this year, while welcome, is not enough; given the current level of threat, the approximately 5000 troops currently stationed in Kosovo are not enough. However, beyond the number of troops, there is a larger problem: the will to act. KFOR’s inability to respond effectively to Serbian aggression can be explained at best as incompetence, and at worst as a lack of will to act.
KFOR’s response so far has been characterized by lethargy and complacency; although KFOR has reiterated its commitment to implementing its mandate in statements issued after the incidents, the lack of urgency and proactive engagement is concerning. This appears to be linked to geopolitical issues that have worrying implications for Kosovo’s security.
The presence within KFOR of countries that do not recognize Kosovo, such as Greece, Slovakia, Moldova and Romania, along with countries friendly to Serbia, such as Hungary – which has the third largest military contingent (469 troops) – means that many contributing states are unwilling to defend Kosovo’s sovereignty against Serbian aggression. For example, the Slovak government – ​​in violation of KFOR’s mandate – has declared that its troops are deployed in Kosovo to protect ethnic Serbs. Meanwhile, Kosovo’s traditional allies – the UK, US, France and Germany – have been distracted by internal instability, the war in Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East, and their interest in demanding that KFOR take a more assertive approach has waned.

Key questions

Journalists, civil society, and political parties in Kosovo should demand clarity from KFOR on its actions so far and on its commitment and readiness to respond to Serbian attacks.
In particular, KFOR must clearly answer the following key questions:

1. Attack on Banjska:

Did KFOR have intelligence on the accumulation of weapons and ammunition in northern Kosovo before the attack in Banjska in September 2023 and, if so, what action was taken based on this information?

2. Cross-border violations:

Since 2023 there have been several violent incursions from Serbia, resulting in injuries and kidnappings; why has KFOR been unable to stop Serbian forces from crossing the border and what is the plan to prevent future Serbian incursions?

3. Weapons smuggling:

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Why has KFOR been unable to stop arms smuggling into Kosovo, what new measures have been taken to prevent this in the future, and can KFOR confirm that these weapons came from Serbia with Belgrade's knowledge?

4.Number of troops:

When and how will KFOR review the number and composition of troops to ensure it can fulfill its mandate to prevent the entry of Serbian forces into Kosovo?

5. Use of force:

Many KFOR contributing states cooperate closely with Serbia in defense agreements, while some do not recognize Kosovo; what measures has KFOR taken to ensure that all its troops will use force if ordered, in the event that Serbian troops or gendarmes cross the border into Kosovo?

The Serbian government’s repeated calls for the creation of a “Serbian World” threaten regional peace and are in line with Milosevic’s plan for a “Greater Serbia” in the 90s. Kosovo’s independence is a vital obstacle to the realization of this destructive goal. Although Kosovo is important for European peace and security, KFOR has not responded effectively to Serbia’s increasingly aggressive actions. KFOR must change its strategy before it is too late.

Ade Clewlow is a retired Lieutenant Colonel and holds the title “Member of the Order of the British Empire.” He was a KFOR liaison officer with the Kosovo Protection Corps during 2008-2009.
Aidan Hehir is Professor of International Relations, University of Westminster, UK

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