The adaptation process of a prime minister
This justification is served by the rhetoric of the prime minister of Kosovo, while the adaptation in Ohrid is fatal and irreversible: there is no recognition, the status against Serbia is reopened, Serbian political-territorial autonomy begins and is gradually built, as a result of imposition, not because something is accepted in Ohrid and so on.
Adaptation or socialization, as it is named in the literature of international relations theory, constitutes one of the key concepts through which conflict, change, competition and cooperation in international relations are described, in short - the behavior of states. The theorization of this concept begins with Kenneth Waltz and his work "Theory of International Politics" (1979). It has been and remains the theory with the greatest explanatory power in international relations, the premises of which we briefly describe below. As such, it is based, first of all, on the idea that the only subject of international relations are states, other non-state actors are peripheral. Second, international relations are inherently anarchic—there is no central government that cares about the safety and well-being of its members. Third, since there is no central government, then each international relations actor must take care of his own security and well-being. Finally, this self-care is expressed through the creation and accumulation of military force, armaments, and the creation of alliances with others, in order to address the security dilemmas that arise in the system - each state sees the armaments and alliances of the other as a security risk. its own and, as a consequence, it addresses this fear and security dilemma through arming and building additional alliances in order to face the security risk. These basic premises do not take into account ideological factors at all, namely whether a country has a communist, fascist, capitalist, liberal and so on system. What carries weight in the calculations of this theoretical approach consists in the strict exercise of the functions for the above, always with the primary goal of producing existential physical security for oneself.
Caring for physical existence constitutes the primary function of the state, which applies to every state. However, states perform this function using different capacities: strong states have the budget and power for greater self-preservation, while small states must always exercise this function in cooperation with others. In search of ensuring self-preservation, on the basis of the premises as above, the process of adaptation of states in international relations takes place. As rational actors, states in their relations with others aim for relative victory, without any consideration for other factors, such as economic, cultural, ideological, etc. In the mathematical representation in game theory and in economic theory, this means that the victory of one side represents an equivalent loss for the other side ("zero-sum game"). In short: in international relations, of vital importance to the state is not how much the other side wins, but whether the victory of one side represents a loss for the other side.
This whole system is based on the gravitational attraction of one center (pax graeca, pax romana, pax mongolica, pax americana, etc.), two centers (bipolarity) or more centers (multipolarity). In each scheme, ideological, cultural, economic and other factors are justifications, never the cause of the adaptation of states' behaviors as rational actors in international relations. Kenneth Waltz has explained this with reference to the elite of the Yugoslav communists, their revolutionary elan, which had fallen to the ground - he tells based on the memories of Millovan Gjilas - the day they had entered Belgrade and had started looting the villas of King Aleksandr Karagjorgjevic in "Dedinje" neighborhood. A similar, but even more significant, description regarding the adaptation of states to the international environment was given by George F. Kennan in what is known as "Telegram X", which was published in 1947 in "Foreign Affairs". There Kennan proved that the Soviet dictator JV Stalin was pursuing a foreign policy that was no different from the foreign policies of the Russian tsars: no ideological consideration of the brotherhood-union of nations and peoples, the well-being and progress of the communist proletariat, the supremacy of the working class peasant and so on were nothing but a farce. This process of adaptation, which Kennan describes, had actually started as early as Lenin's time: after the October Revolution, he made peace in Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, withdrew from the fronts of the First World War, recognized the right to independence and self-determination of the oppressed peoples of the Russian periphery, only to devour them one by one five years later; in 1922 it created what later became known as the Soviet Union, whose foreign policy until the last breath had nothing to do with ideological considerations. That state left ideology aside and accommodated itself in the international system of power politics and balance of power. This is what happens to all countries, without any exception: the countries that do not adapt remain on the periphery without any international role or weight, as was the case of Enver Hoxha's Albania, Vietnam and Cambodia during the Cold War and many other cases of that time and then.
The two basic premises of the dialogue
We have seen a similar process of adaptation of Kosovo these last two years, after the coming to power of the LVV. As we all remember, in one of the first meetings of Prime Minister Kurti in Brussels, he took with him a bunch of books, in which he talks about the genocide and the Serbian territory in Kosovo, books that were published by an ordinary wholesaler for profit purposes; they had circulated in the offices of previous governments, were pre-purchased at a price of up to 120 euros per piece. Well, this doesn't carry any weight here at all. What carries weight, and must be said, has to do with the fact that their presentation in Brussels to the mediators ended that day - then it was not followed by Prime Minister Kurti, it was forgotten. This was the first sign that indicated the beginning of Kurt's adaptation process to the international environment, which is here personified by the European Union, the densest and most intense normative structure that the history of international relations has known. The revolutionary drive was abandoned, just as the snake abandons its epidermis in the change of its life cycle. In addition to the book, the lawsuit for genocide, which began those days in Brussels and the pompous delivery of the now forgotten book, was also forgotten: the two projects now belong to history. A stain was left behind, from the start, however, judging by what a Western diplomat had told me in those days, based on the first-hand account of Mr. Borrell himself: "This Kosovo guy is interesting, apparently it will get complicated this work of dialogue with him is a little bit!". In fact, it turned out to be such only for Kurt, who that day in Brussels was being forced to adapt to the normative structures of the European Union, which see Kosovo as a secessionist state that is not yet complete. What was not adapted is Kurt's aggressive, revolutionary and subversive discourse, but which has no importance for our relations with the international environment around us.
Ohrid, the culminating moment of Prime Minister Kurti's adaptation
Before summarizing the points of adaptation of the Cure in Ohrid, we must say a few words about the premises on which the approach of the European Union towards Kosovo is based, which have nothing to do with who is in charge of mediation in dialogue. The starting point of the European Union's policy towards Kosovo, including the member countries that have recognized Kosovo, is that the dialogue takes place under the mandate of the United Nations Organization: after the historic opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo, the UN General Assembly has authorized the European Union to address the remaining issues between Kosovo and Serbia. This position is based on another starting point, which is entirely based on international law: Kosovo is the only case of successful secession after 1990; what is said to be a sui generis case has a political basis, never a legal-international basis. The essence of sui generis is this: the West has made it clear that the case of Kosovo, its creation as a state, deviates from the normative standard of international law due to intense Serbian repression; he does not hesitate to repeat the case of Kosovo as a precedent anywhere else within the sphere of Western influence. That's it! The problem with the international law of secession of Kosovo, however successful, remains behind and open. The European Union bases its starting point on this: in order to be a proper state, especially within this dense and intensive normative structure, Kosovo must receive the recognition of the state from which it was separated - Serbia. In principle, existing states, including EU member states, have great consideration for states from which another state secedes, due to the fact that they thereby maintain the normative principle of self-preservation. In other words, Borell and Lajaçk, or anyone else on behalf of the European Union, will behave the same way: Kosovo as a secessionist state is seen and treated with an inferior position compared to the state from which it was separated - Serbia, for which at the same time apply as a whole the norms and principles of international law. For a state like Kosovo, meanwhile, such norms and principles apply only for the purposes of adapting to the requirements of the precursor state, which is Serbia, and the European Union as the final approver of any agreement between the parties.
Prime Minister Kurti adapted to this approach in Ohrid, definitively and irreversibly. On the day that the text of the instrument for implementation in Ohrid was made public, every normal lawyer was clear that its text as a whole leans towards Serbia, with a pronounced tendency to restore its sovereignty in Kosovo. The European Union has dictated its content based on the basic premise, where one side is a secessionist and the other a sovereign and independent state. Kosovo has adapted to it, completely and without any reservations, without being aware of what is the basic premise of the mediator in the dialogue against the secession of the states. From this adaptation, four aspects that remain in Kurti's burden, have fatal consequences for the sovereignty and independence of Kosovo. First, in the preamble or introduction of the Ohrid text, there is no mention of the recognition between the parties of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, but only of that of Serbia: the language used there is in the third person or neutral language, which refers only to the states that have complete and undisputed sovereignty on the international level, which is Serbia and not Kosovo. Second, the status of Kosovo has been reopened in relation to Serbia, because in Ohrid, Serbia is recognized with the right to prejudice the status in the same way as it is recognized for other non-recognizing countries in the EU and abroad. Third, in Ohrid, the transformation of the Association into full political-territorial and personal autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs, their churches and objects of cult and national history took place. Finally, fourthly, according to the Brussels/Ohrid Agreement, Serbia does not have any international obligations towards Kosovo or towards the international community: those obligations it has linked to the disappeared are obligations without international implications, while the issue of Kosovo's non-repentance for membership in international organizations there can be no bilateral sanction, because no international organization operates in such a way that it depends on the will of Serbia for the inclusion or not of Kosovo in its bosom. In any interpretation of this adaptation of Mr. Kurti, the recognition of Kosovo, whether de facto or de jure, cannot be inferred. It belongs to history: its return to the agenda can only be done in the circumstances of another shock to the international order in the part that deals with the Balkans. Hard to imagine something like that!
At first, few understood that Kurt's screams and resistance to fulfilling his past vows were not really what they seemed, but a new stratagem, a new way of communicating with others, with a reference point. always vote and political legitimacy in Kosovo. Initially, it was directed against the alleged criminal groups of Serbs in the north, to be generalized later to the social groups within the Albanian political body. The space for "stand up and don't break it" in the north is large, it has been like this since June 1999, because neither side has infinite space for projecting force. Violent maneuvering in the north of the country, but also in other parts, can be undertaken from time to time, without the risk of general escalation, because the Serbian side cannot have a large-scale military and police commitment, as a result of international restrictions: their violation necessarily leads to total instability on a large scale in the countries around Kosovo. This is the basic factor on which is based the semi-threatening policy, why not with tones of incompetence, that the official Prishtina leads in the north. Others have done this before the current government. The only difference is that others did not translate this possibility into political legitimacy, due to the naive belief that the controlled escalation in the north represents a further step in concluding the dialogue with Serbia. Kurti is the first to understand that the escalation in the north leads in the opposite direction - to the removal of the closure of the dialogue with Serbia and the strengthening of Serbian influence in the country, not only in the north.
What we saw on September 14 is unlike anything we've seen before: the raising of tone, the dramatic rhetoric, the threat of political opponents - as in the Greek tragedies that simultaneously depict human suffering and man as its antidote, is done as a function of postponement ahead of the agreed agenda in Ohrid. At first glance, it seems as if it is about someone who refuses, squirms and chews the last words, does not bring out the prophetic messages for the people he represents, because he wants to protect them from an evil that he has inherited from others; in short, suitor doesn't want Troy to be destroyed and him to stay alive! This, however, is not entirely correct: we have seen this stratagem in the former Yugoslav territory played by others with rare skill. In this sense, from a political point of view, this approach to the adaptation process is completely legitimate and allowed. It is important for the voter to see that the leader took it from him, he did not give it; he did not make painful concessions, they forced him; Kosovo sacrificed de facto and de jure recognition, not because it wanted to, but because it was imposed on it. This justification is served by the rhetoric of the prime minister of Kosovo, while the adaptation in Ohrid is fatal and irreversible: there is no recognition, the status against Serbia is reopened, Serbian political-territorial autonomy begins and is gradually built, as a result of imposition, not because something is accepted in Ohrid and so on.
(The author was the president of the Constitutional Court and is a professor of law and international relations)
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