Support TIME. Preserve the truth.
Opinions

How the start of World War III was avoided in Kosovo

The surprise entry of the Russians into Pristina and then their deployment at Pristina Airport was a reminder of how uncertain the circumstances were still, how unpredictable Russia is, and the West was no longer sure who was making decisions on Russia's behalf in Moscow. Because the Russian Foreign Ministry was telling the Americans and NATO that "this was a mistake" or "a misunderstanding" and that those forces would be withdrawn immediately. But at the same time, the Russian forces already at Pristina Airport were preparing to be assisted by thousands of special forces from Moscow. This would strengthen them and force NATO into negotiations for the division of Kosovo's areas and territory.

26 years ago, at this time, when NATO was getting ready to begin its deployment in Kosovo, after it was liberated and senior NATO and Serbian military officials had reached an agreement for the withdrawal of Serbian forces and the entry of NATO into Pristina, suddenly Russian military forces appeared. Tired and exhausted, with some old military equipment, they had traveled hundreds of kilometers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they were on the SFOR peacekeeping mission, while in Pristina they had aroused the euphoria of the Serbs who came out to welcome them, with flags, songs and dances, even dancing on Russian tanks.

At that time, in Skopje, they expected NATO, according to a well-prepared plan, with the belief that both the Russians and the Serbs had agreed to it, to begin its entry into Kosovo. The news that the Russians had entered Pristina on June 11 stunned NATO, surprised and shocked many major Western capitals, and raised doubts about whether the weeks-long efforts by the US, Britain, Germany, and others to get Moscow on their side had really succeeded. Or was Moscow pursuing a “double-dealing” policy to confront the West? A day before NATO entered Kosovo, the implementation of the principle and goal of “Serbian forces out, NATO in, and Kosovar refugees back in their homes” was questioned. These three goals were the principle from which NATO did not waver for 78 days, which is why the airstrike operation was so long.

Support the TIME. Preserve the truth.

Professional journalism is in the public interest. Your support helps it remain independent and credible. Contribute too. 1 euro makes a difference.

Letter to the Reader — Why We're Asking for Your Support Contribute

NATO and Russia had constant contacts, despite Moscow's anger over the airstrikes on Serbia. Because some NATO countries insisted that the ground presence in Kosovo should be done with UN permission, Russia also had to be won over. The Russians first demanded that part of the agreement be the remaining of a significant number of Serbian soldiers in Kosovo. When this was rejected, they demanded that the Russians have a sector in the north where their forces would be deployed. This was also rejected, but with the promise that a modality would be found for the presence of Russian soldiers in an international military mission. And Russia, as a result of these discussions, would support the Resolution for the placement of Kosovo under a UN civilian administration, with a role for the OSCE in the creation of local democratic institutions and a military presence led by NATO. Part of the agreement was also the disarmament of the KLA. But the Russians' surprise entry into Pristina and then their deployment at Pristina Airport was a reminder of how uncertain the circumstances still were, how unpredictable Russia is, and the West was no longer sure who was making decisions on Russia's behalf in Moscow. Because the Russian Foreign Ministry was telling the Americans and NATO that "this was a mistake" or "a misunderstanding" and that those forces would be withdrawn immediately.

But at the same time, the Russian forces already at Pristina Airport were preparing to be assisted by thousands of special forces from Moscow. This would strengthen them and force NATO into a negotiation for the division of Kosovo's areas and territory.

There are many stories about that event, which is still talked about today as the most sensitive moment in which the third world war could have started. General Wesley Clark, then commander of NATO forces in Europe, who had also commanded the airstrike operation, had demanded that KFOR take control of Pristina Airport by force, where Russian forces were stationed. The first commander of KFOR, Michael Jackson, had refused. He is quoted as saying that he “does not want to start the third world war”. Jackson is quoted as telling friends that he felt very bad because, as a soldier, this was the first time in his career that he had refused to carry out an order from a superior officer. Something that is unthinkable for soldiers.

On the scene, in favor of NATO, two countries that were not yet part of this alliance emerged. Romania and Bulgaria. They refused to give permission for Russian planes to use their airspace to reinforce the military contingent that had entered Pristina, at the airport. This had greatly helped these countries, without being ready according to objective criteria, to become members of NATO in 2004 and of the EU in 2007. “We cannot imagine what would have happened in the Balkans if Bulgaria and Romania had not been on our side at that critical moment,” former Enlargement Commissioner Gunther Verheugen once said, who also gave permission for Bulgaria and Romania to join the EU even though everyone thought they were far from meeting the conditions at the time.

Everything ended well later. NATO did not need to fight against Russian forces in Kosovo, but to help them with food and equipment. Then the Russian forces were also put at the service of the KFOR mission under NATO command.

For a time, there were good relations between NATO and Russia, and cooperation in Kosovo was cited as an example of this. The partnership and cooperation continued through a joint NATO-Russia Council until Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine began, when Russia was again defined as a major threat to NATO's security.

Today, when the 26th anniversary of the liberation of Kosovo is marked, which practically happened with the deployment of NATO forces and the departure of Serbian forces, the episode of June 1999 serves as evidence of how often events of historical importance depend on a few small incidents that could have easily gone in a different direction.