Serbs outside Serbia live in countries where human freedoms and democratic rights are greater than for Serbs in Serbia. A Serbian citizen of Serbia has not yet achieved the basic right to free voting, which is enjoyed by Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo. In the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, one of the primary motives was the independence of states and nations from Serbia, the politics of domination and supremacism. This process left Serbia alone with the basic code of domination and supremacism still alive, a code that requires the homogenization of the population, the treatment of oppositional action as a national heresy and, ultimately, the obstruction - even by force - of forces committed to liberal democracy.
1.
Next week, Montenegro celebrates the 20th anniversary of its declaration of independence, or, to be more precise (and here Montenegrins rightly insist), the renewal of the independent state of Montenegro, the one that was once declared independent in 1878 and then more or less annexed by Serbia in 1918, forty years later. This penultimate act of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia was supposed to bring added value; not only would Montenegro become an independent state, but as a result of this act, the State Union with Serbia would be dissolved and Serbia would also become an independent state.
Two years after the renewal of Montenegrin independence, the declaration of Kosovo's independence as the final act of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (and part of an internationally coordinated process initiated within the obligations of the UN) was supposed to help Serbia finally become an independent state.
However, this does not seem to be the case. Serbia is, on one foot, a state that, as an independent, is conducting not very successful negotiations for membership in the European Union, and on the other foot, a state that is still not fulfilling that role towards its neighbors.
What is not evident for Serbia is what is evident for all other states of the former Yugoslavia - dissolution has occurred, new states have been created, Kosovo is one of them.
also
"Serbia entered Kosovo in 1912 with the ideology that Albanians have tails"
2.
This historical process, which is not closed to Serbia, has become a political principle and doctrine. Since contesting Kosovo's independence is at the same time a contestation of the process of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia develops a doctrine of contestation on three levels. The first two are history and geography (or more precisely, political geography).
The act of contesting the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia begins with contesting the historical reality of Kosovo, but it expands everywhere, contesting the historical realities of its neighbors. For Serbia (I am talking about that majority that is in power or that supports the majority's discourse), Croatia is a genocidal state towards Serbs, Bosnia-Herzegovina is somewhere in the crisis of annexation by Austria-Hungary in 1878, Montenegro is a few days before the decision whether to annex or not at the end of World War I, while Kosovo remains in an eternal moment - from the songs collected by Vuk Karadzic of the "Kosovo Cycle" and beyond - of the collective lute that mourns the loss of Kosovo by the Ottomans and at the same time warns of the day when it will return to it.
The dominant historical discourse in Serbia has long forgotten the year 1945 and all the subsequent years of the former Yugoslavia and Serbia within it; the selected history of this discourse is sometimes the medieval Kingdom of Tsar Dushan, sometimes of one dynasty and sometimes of another royal dynasty, as if it were a projection of a straight line that begins in the Middle Ages and will end within a few years with a Serbia that will gather all Serbs (something that, it is forgotten, Tito's Yugoslavia had done and which was ruined by Greater Serbian nationalism with the occupation of Kosovo in 1989–1990).
3.
In psychology, the phenomenon that would come closest to describing Serbia is called “cognitive immobility”. This phrase, coined by Dr. Ezenwa Olumba, a British scientist of Nigerian origin, describes the mental blockage in the past that people, especially immigrants, experience. Those who have moved to other host countries remain trapped in the life they left behind. In a way, the collective discourse of the majority in Serbia has remained trapped in the past and, as we have seen, in a past that stops somewhere at the beginning of the 20th century; a Serbia that lives in the trap of a past before modernity, namely before the literacy of the majority.
also
Vučić's statement sparks clash between Montenegro and Serbia
This, unlike the “immigrant trap”, is happening to Serbia without changing its place. Serbia is where it has been, but confronting history - that the process of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia is not over - it is now confronting political geography. The new realities of political geography are the independent states that surround Serbia, and these realities confront “cognitive immobility”, the former idea that Serbia had the right to administer those territories (through various kingdoms) or at least had a central place to decide on their future, that it was a key geopolitical point in the region.
The struggle with the new political geography is one of the biggest cognitive frictions for Serbia. Where Serbia tried most to dictate the conditions in which Serbs will live through war - such as in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo - fewer Serbs live than before. Serbia's relevance for a better life for Serbs outside Serbia continues to be negative; Serbia remains relevant only as a generator or instigator of problems for neighboring states, not as a factor in solving and neighboring coexistence. And, moreover, Serbs outside Serbia live in states where human freedoms and democratic rights are greater than for Serbs in Serbia. A Serbian citizen of Serbia has not yet achieved the basic right to free voting, which the Serbs of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo have.
4.
If the two planes of Serbia's contestation were history and political geography, the third plane remains to be explained. The third plane of contestation is itself; the Serbia of the majority discourse is contesting the idea of an independent Serbia.
The ongoing contestation of the historical and political geography levels leaves Serbia undecided about its state identity. Is it the responsibility of this state to decide what a Serb from Banja Luka decides for his life? Is the Adriatic the lost sea of Serbia since Montenegro renewed its independence? Should the deputy from Štrpce or Novo Brdo in the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo think with Belgrade's head? Is Serbia the westernmost territorial extension of Russia? Is the European Union just an ATM from which Serbia withdraws money and sends back young people who flee to find work and seek refuge from a state that sees its greatest achievement ahead in the rearview mirror?
And how important are all of these for the citizen of Serbia? How much are these parts of the state interest? How much do these issues determine the salary, the road, the water, the price of electricity, the quality of the school, public safety, environmental regulation and protection, pensions and the feeling that the next generation of happy Serbs can grow up in this country?
A state that did not love its citizens – Albanians in Yugoslavia
In the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, one of the primary motives was the independence of states and nations from Serbia, the politics of domination and supremacism. This process left Serbia alone with the basic code of domination and supremacism still alive, a code that necessitates the homogenization of the population, the treatment of oppositional action as national heresy, and, ultimately, the obstruction - even by force - of forces committed to liberal democracy.
Now the time has come for Serbia to become independent from this Serbia.