Lessons of the Suez Canal for the North

During the Suez crisis, the US's closest allies - the United Kingdom, Israel and France - realized the weight of American fury. Failure to read American interests and worldviews correctly results in their international humiliation, crucifixion and kneeling. Today, when we half-heartedly raise the question "with coordination or without coordination", we have the answer in mind

"Antoni, are you normal?"

US President Dwight Eisenhower on the phone with British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, 1956.

Who could have imagined that the time would come when the US would join Russia in the Security Council to sanction its most important allies: the United Kingdom, France and Israel. But this time was brought by the year 1956.

In 1956, the United Kingdom, France and Israel invaded Egypt despite warnings from the US not to do so. Although the formal cause of the invasion was to gain control of the Suez Canal, the underlying motivations for the invasion were based on a complex range of political, economic and security factors. But all these factors also had a name: Gamal Abdel Nasser. The new Egyptian president was an Arab nationalist who was an unacceptable threat to the United Kingdom, France and Israel. His decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was the last straw. But the US did not share this opinion. For the US, invading Egypt would be an unnecessary crisis that would be a distraction from the main cold war priority: dealing with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the US believed that with careful and patient diplomacy, President Nasser could become an important ally against the Soviet Union and the spread of communism in the Middle East.

The conquest of Egypt coincided with another epochal event of the time: the Hungarian Revolution. Consequently, all US attention and commitment was in supporting the Hungarian people in their liberation from Soviet captivity. And the same week that British planes were bombing Port Said, Soviet tanks invaded Budapest's squares. Thus, the invasion of Egypt undermined American efforts to create a global alliance in condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and breaking the Iron Curtain in Budapest. So the US found itself in a very difficult position, since on the one hand it was accusing the Soviet Union of invading Hungary, while on the other hand its allies were invading Egypt. Not only did the United Kingdom, France, and Israel divert world attention from Hungary, but they also gave Soviet propaganda an excellent opportunity to accuse the West of double standards. And not only that, by invading Egypt they set in motion dangerous security dynamics that had all the potential for direct nuclear confrontation between the US and Russia.

The US reaction to its closest traditional allies was swift and harsh. Condemned the occupation of Egypt and joined the Soviet Union at the United Nations in calling for an immediate withdrawal from Egypt. Enraged by the lack of coordination and unilateral actions of its allies, the US was ready to economically and financially bring to its knees the United Kingdom, which desperately needed American help, as London's financial bankruptcy was imminent. Faced with unanimous international condemnation and American fury, the United Kingdom, France and Israel withdrew in humiliation from Egypt, achieving exactly what they set out to prevent: the complete consolidation of Egyptian power over the Suez Canal.

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Although no historical analogy does history justice, the reason I decided to bring up the fiasco of the Suez crisis is to highlight the similarities with our fiasco to the north. Misreading US interests and worldviews correctly could prove fatal for its allies. Just like the United Kingdom with the Suez crisis, Kosovo today with the crisis in the north is not reading the interests of the USA.

Today, the main priority of the USA is to save the liberal world order by pushing back Russia in Ukraine. And while the entire US military machinery is engaged in supporting Ukraine, all US diplomacy is engaged in preventing any other crisis that might distract the US and the world from the Russian occupation of Ukraine. In this spirit, the crisis in the north, the injury of NATO soldiers and the debate over the administration of the most insignificant municipal offices on the European continent are unnecessary distractions of international attention at a time when that attention should be exclusively dedicated to Ukraine. In Kissinger's words: "Moments of historical weight must not be hindered by pathetic calculations."

Secondly, the mistake that the United Kingdom made in reading Nasser, Kosovo makes today in reading Vučić.

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Unlike its allies, the US believes in converting its enemies into allies. The gap in Nasser's peerage between the US and the UK has cost the latter dearly. The gap in the same evaluation of Vucic between the USA and Kosovo is costing Kosovo dearly. Kosovo sees Serbia for what it was in the XNUMXth century, the USA sees Serbia for what it can be in the XNUMXst century.

Third, the United Kingdom's Suez Canal fiasco only strengthened Nasser's position in Egypt. Today, our fiasco in the north is only strengthening Vucic's position in the north. Our decision to use force to compensate for the lack of democratic legitimacy has only exposed the weakness of our position. There is no force that can replace democracy. The north of the country will not be integrated quickly, nor by force. It will require wisdom, patience and the long-term creation of political and economic conditions that will connect the Serbian minority with the society of Kosovo. This is painstaking and time-consuming, but that's what democracy is: complicated and difficult.

There is no shortcut.

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Finally, in the floor of the Assembly, Prime Minister Kurti asked if we should act in coordination with the Americans or without coordination. And while parliamentary debates should always be taken with a dose of humor and generosity, the question definitely still remains. Prime Minister Kurti for the first time is leading us towards a new path in dialogue.

This is a brave and courageous act. In this new path of dialogue, he is on a collision course with the Americans. Today there is nothing easier for Kurti than to become the next "yes man" and earn the epithet of the American ally, but the citizens have given their verdict for the past ten years of dialogue and Kurti has received a mandate to lead the country in a new direction. However, as brave as it is to try new paths in our confrontation with Serbia, it is noble to admit that you were wrong. During the Suez crisis, America's closest allies realized within a week the extent of the mistake made and despite international humiliation and crucifixion, they accepted the mistake made at all costs. They did so, because they understood the answer to the question whether it is better with coordination or without it. They understood after the American President Eisenhower asked the English Prime Minister Eden: "Antoni, are you normal?". I hope we will understand before President Biden asks the Prime Minister of Kosovo: "Albin, are you normal?"