The buzz and current of Berlin

Ambassador Grenell's intervention and the delay of the energy agreement show one thing: there is still no proper preparation for serious negotiations.

1.

As if they were coordinated, within two days two models of Western foreign policy action against Kosovo surfaced. One was that of Ambassador Grenell's tweet and the other was the announcement of the KOSTT-ENTSO energy agreement.

Ambassador Grenell's action, in the wake of breaking American diplomatic tradition in Kosovo (and other countries) tweeted that "when taxes/reciprocity are lifted (probably this week) the dialogue will really begin." This was a response to the country's president's tweet warning a new government and saying that "tariffs & reciprocity should be removed in order to strengthen US & EU support for Kosovo".

Without going into the subtleties of the form (diplomacy knows how to deliver even more brutal messages in a more subtle form), I am more attracted by the internal paradox of the ambassador's request. A new government is being asked to remove the tax 100 percent (although this has already been done) and to remove reciprocity measures towards Serbia so that "dialogue can really begin". The goal of the dialogue, it is already known in written form, should establish interstate relations of mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia. The internal paradox is evident: Kosovo must give up the policy of reciprocity established by the Government in office (and legitimized, although not yet accepted by the European Commission) so that through a dialogue, the contours of which are not even known of mediation principles, to reach a state of reciprocity.

If this is the case, why should reciprocity not remain and the starting point of a "truly dialogue" be based on the simple fact that Kosovo declared its independence in 2008 (in the first place thanks to the American leadership) and going from the teenager in the "adult club" has the sovereign right to decide the relations with the neighbors?

2.

Perhaps the word sovereignty can help us understand the answer.

As the chairman of the LDK said, the first thing the new government would do would be to give up reciprocity. With this, the new government would not only enter the trap of internal paradox, but would undertake something that I do not believe has happened to European states. So, the new Government would have to, as the government of a sovereign country, give up an essential instrument of sovereignty, and this is reciprocity. All EU countries have done this as part of a written contract. So, they have given a part of the sovereign rights that belong to the classic states so that they can be transferred to the Community, the EU. Something is being asked of Kosovo that is completely opposite from the European notion of regulating relations, to give up sovereignty (even temporarily) in exchange for a promise ("dialogue with truth").

Of course, the argument stuck in one of the oldest diplomatic tricks "why, don't you believe us that you're asking for something in writing?" can come out, but the graveyard of diplomatic failures is full of initiatives whose culminating argument was "why don't you believe us". As an illustration, the Agreement for association of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo was signed by Kosovar politicians, to whom diplomats came and said the magic words "don't you believe us?".

The problems will not stop there. In a negotiation process, in which one party has to give up a part of sovereignty, not only does the weaker enter it, but it creates a precedent. If at the beginning of the negotiation process you gave up reciprocity (your sovereign right), why not give up a part of your territory (your sovereign right) at the end of the negotiation process?

If you accepted the "don't you believe us?" mode at the beginning, why not accept it at the end?

3.

In front of this model, another one emerged, that of the energy agreement. And I don't think that there will be supporters of Europe who at this moment will say: here is a good, successful agreement, against a weak American tweeting model. But here's why it's not entirely like that.

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The official news is that yesterday the new Connection Agreement between the Transmission System Operator and the Electricity Market of Kosovo (KOSTT) and the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Energy (ENTSO) was voted. In terms of practical operation, Kosovo is no longer considered part of a group consisting of Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia, but is part of a separate group with Albania. In practical terms, Serbia can no longer decide on the electricity that passes through the wires that are above or below the territory of the Republic of Kosovo. And, in practical terms and by analogy with roads, electricity between Albania and Kosovo will circulate on a four or six lane highway instead of a two lane road, sometimes paved and sometimes not.

In the political sense, Kosovo's sovereignty in the electrical energy system was established yesterday, in a sense not only the boundaries were established, but also the right to make decisions within those electrical boundaries.

The external service of the European Union can say that this is a victory for the Brussels dialogue for normalization, because the Agreement for the normalization of energy networks was signed in 2015 between the delegation of Kosovo and that of Serbia. But it's not like that, or at all.

4.

The Brussels normalization dialogue was structured not to be structured. An agreement was signed and then negotiations began for its implementation. Meanwhile, some other topic came up and so on. The President of Serbia, Vucic, was one of the first to recognize that the energy issue is a matter of sovereignty and did not allow it to go any further, but requested that it be linked to the "final agreement", or if not, at least to the creation of the Association of Serbian Municipalities.

And this story would have been like this if Germany had not intervened. The issue of the energy agreement was raised several times by the German leadership at the highest levels of Serbia and Kosovo. Germany invested 75 million euros in the fast connection (400kv interconnection) and 100 million euros in KOSTT. He did this as part of promoting economic development in the region, but also to stabilize the European energy network. When Serbia was blocked in its position, while the negotiations did not continue, Germany undertook a successful lobbying for the issue to be depoliticized and to be part of the decision-making of energy operators at the European level. For two years now, a German team has been dealing with this without much fanfare. And yesterday, with 22 votes for, 3 against and 4 abstentions, the right was won to manage electricity in the territory of Kosovo and that this energy can come and go freely through the "highway" of Albania, and through it everywhere in European "highways".

It was not a success of the Commission. It was the correction of the shortcomings of Brussels through a determined policy of Berlin.

5.

So, what happened within these two days and two diplomatic models for Kosovo?

The shortest and easiest common denominator is that there is a lack of a concept to move forward. Tweets cannot substitute transatlantic principle-building for a serious negotiation process. And, the shortcomings created by the frivolous processes like that of Brussels will not always be able to be covered by benevolent states or those interested in providing solutions.

Quarantine is a good time to think.