A common security area for the Western Balkans, as part of the single European security space, is not only a step towards membership in the European Union, but it is the transition from the logic of national issues to the logic of common security. In it, no state will build its own security by producing insecurity for the other.
1.
Imagine this event for a moment.
On July 13, 2028, the heads of state and government of the Western Balkan countries will gather in Berlin. Their host, the German Prime Minister, will deliver a speech in which he mentions that the date, 150 years before the Congress of Berlin, has been chosen for a moment that will mark one of the great turning points in the history of the Western Balkans and Europe.
“We are here because one hundred and fifty years after the Congress of Berlin, the leaders of the states of Southeast Europe and we of other parts of the continent recognize that national issues raised in the 19th century cannot be resolved with 19th century instruments. Security can no longer be built through territorial expansion, spheres of influence or the protection of communities from external patrons, but only through a common European security space.”
At the signing ceremony of the document, the leaders of the Western Balkans are seated and standing behind them are the leaders of the EU member states, who are waiting their turn to sign from the guarantor country. One hundred and fifty years later, the guarantors are not only the traditional powers such as Britain, France, Germany and Italy, but also Spain, Poland and Ukraine, among others.
The NATO Secretary General delivers the welcoming speech.
"Today, for the first time in the modern history of the region, the countries of the Western Balkans have come together, not for someone to decide for them, but for them to take responsibility for their common security."
In the family photo, the leaders of the Western Balkans hold the Agreement on Security and Cooperation of the Western Balkan States in their hands. Since the announcement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation of the Western Balkan States in Berlin and the signing of the final document, abbreviations with historical analogies have already entered the media. Instead of the Berlin Congress, this event is called the Berlin Conference on Balkan Security (or simply the Berlin Conference) and the signed act is called the Berlin Conference Agreement.
What peace should look like 150 years after the Congress of Berlin
2.
The Berlin Conference is the culmination of two years of intensive work, which began with an analysis done in 2026 that says something like this:
a) The departure of the US as the main contributor to European security is an irreversible process, no matter who is president.
b) European states will take responsibility for their own security space, from Great Britain to the Ukraine-Russia border, including Turkey as a fundamental factor in this space.
c) The European security space should include the Western Balkans. This area of unresolved conflicts should be integrated as a security area, within the single European security space.
d) The integration of the Western Balkans as a security area within the European security space would accelerate the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU and at the same time the political and security cohesion of Europe.
The conclusion of the analysis was focused on answering the question of what are the driving forces, or historical vectors, that make the region a zone of unresolved conflicts?
3.
The ideological differences of the 20th century, the division of the world in the Cold War, the Balkans divided into different spheres of interest?
Yes, they all have their merits. But it was the Congress of Berlin in 1878 that marked the moment when Europe institutionalized the national affairs of the Balkans as part of its political order. At that time, Bismarck's Germany, as a self-proclaimed party disinterested in the future of the Balkans, called on the then Great Powers to see how the "Eastern Crisis" would be managed, namely the slow and certain death of the Ottoman Empire. And, protecting the interests of the Western Powers, the decision was made to recognize the independence of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro.
For the past 150 years, Serbia has remained a hostage to the then-conceived concept: if Serbia is a nation-state, then all Serbs must be included in it. The entire 20th century witnessed wars, Serbian victims, and those of the Serbs' neighboring peoples, in order to achieve this unattainable goal.
The Albanians, not included in the Berlin Congress, remained its hostage. They tried to articulate in the League of Prizren their own project with a territorial political autonomy (within the Ottoman Empire) that would include the Albanians of the Western Balkans. The project of the Albanian proto-national state was not realized in the form imagined in the 19th century and the 20th century was spent with killings, expulsions and persecutions to achieve the integration of the interests of the Albanians in the countries where they were scattered.
Bosnia and Herzegovina remained a hostage of the Congress. It experienced the first explosion of the First World War in its capital and experienced the last genocide in Europe in the 20th century, among other things because of the idea that the state belongs to the “state-forming nation”, i.e. the dominant one. The “state-forming nation” prevents Bosnia and Herzegovina from functioning as a democratic state of its citizens.
Meanwhile, this formula is and has been the formula for the frictions surrounding the Republic of Macedonia, or rather North Macedonia.
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The process of national-ethnic state formation, legitimized in the 19th-century European order, continued to fuel competition for territories, borders, and populations even after empires, ideologies, and political systems changed.
4.
In 2026, a “non-paper” was produced on the idea of the Berlin Conference on the 150th anniversary of the Congress. Part of this “non-paper” were the following points:
a) Nation states, a 19th century concept, cannot be built in the 21st century Western Balkans. The continuation of the nation state concept will be the main driver of keeping the region as an unfinished conflict.
b) The arms race of the Western Balkan states, the ongoing conflictual narratives, the culture of war - all of which are developing in parallel and in open opposition to the idea and efforts in the EU integration process. The “Gogol” of national issues looms over all other processes and the arms race is (still) part of the race for the nation-state.
c) National issues can be resolved in a space of security and cooperation of democratic states, respecting the rights of their citizens, including those who are part of non-majority communities.
d) The six Western Balkan states belong to their citizens and fulfill the identity needs of the nations of the region. And, all six states need to consider security as a common value and build policies for a common security area, that of the Western Balkans. The weapons that are being purchased and produced should not be the product of fear of each other, but of a European defense project.
e) To do this, the six Western Balkan states need to formalize commitments to respect the integrity, sovereignty and sovereignty of the states of the region and to build their own space of security and cooperation on this basis.
f) The Western Balkans security and cooperation area will be an integral part of the single European security area. The European countries invited to this and agreeing to this will be guarantors of the common security area of the Western Balkans.
g) In 1878, Europe decided what the Balkans would look like. In 2028, the Western Balkans have the opportunity to define how they want to contribute to European security. The 19th century sought to resolve national issues by creating states; the 21st century can only overcome them by creating a common security space.
5.
This sketch describes a possible future.
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In it, the common security space means that no state anymore builds its own security by producing insecurity for the other.
This requires a paradigm shift.