Anatomy of a lie (4)

Jakup Krasniqi was the face of the KLA associated with unity, political consensus and responsibility for the historical moment in Rambouillet. H. Thaçi, who was the face of polarization, resigned one day before the end of the conference in an attempt to fail the conferences. These are now hidden in books and for this the historical figures are not responsible, but the authors of the books, including academician Arsim Bajrami

1.

A paragraph from the book by academic A. Bajrami largely summarizes a flawed premise, which leads to errors in this book and to a large extent in an important part of the public discourse:

After much pressure, Thaçi finally made the long-awaited decision to say yes to the Rambouillet Agreement and pave the way for NATO military intervention, which led to the liberation of Kosovo and later its independence. Thaçi's transition from a political leader of the KLA to a central figure of the Rambouillet Conference made him later a key figure in the Kosovo independence process, when he reached the culmination of his leadership on February 17, 2008, by reading the Declaration of Independence, which declared Kosovo a sovereign and independent state. Without a doubt, Rambouillet was the brightest point in Hashim Thaçi's political history.

From the accounts so far of all witnesses of the Rambouillet Conference, it emerges that he was the main negative figure of this conference who tried until the last moment - of Mr. Rubin's conversation and the mention of Hollywood - to prevent Kosovo from signing the Agreement and thus losing American support.

So, he was not the central figure of the Conference; yes, he could be called its most polarizing figure. And, with the same realism, the other conclusion would also be rejected, that he was the “main figure of the Kosovo independence process”, because he read the Declaration of Independence. Independence was scheduled to be declared in 2007 and if it happened that Agim Çeku read the Declaration, would he be the “main figure of the Kosovo independence process”? Or would Fatmir Sejdiu, the president of Kosovo in 2007 and 2008, become such? Or would Jakup Krasniqi, the speaker of the Assembly in 2007 and 2008, become such?

Moreover, the Ahtisaari process has been one of the best examples of Kosovo's political unity, including the participation of non-majority communities. Academician Bajrami also participated in this process. How did Mr. Thaçi become a leading figure when he was equal to other colleagues, Kolë Berisha or Agim Çeku, for example?

2.

Hashim Thaçi has shown throughout his political career a great ability to hide gross failures (such as his behavior at the Rambouillet conference or in the negotiation process with Serbia for the normalization of relations) and one of the ways to do this has been by creating the discourse about his role as a “leading figure” at Rambouillet and in the “independence process”. H. Thaçi cannot be held responsible for this distortion, because with this agility, among other skills, he has created and maintained political power.

But, for this, the responsibility lies with the repeaters of this public discourse, which has already entered history textbooks or, as is the case with Mr. Bajrami in the book of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo. Throughout his book, Mr. Bajrami describes Mr. Thaçi as the head of the Delegation, which should perhaps be a justification of the historical weight of the “leader”. But, here begins the fundamental error, because Hashim Thaçi was one of the four members of the Presidency of the Delegation. He was the head of the Presidency, primus inter pares and one of the reasons for this (part of a long story for another time) was the manifestation of the support of the entire Kosovo Delegation to the KLA.

Academician Bajrami knows this and has mentioned it in his book. As he mentioned the principle of consensus in our delegation. I proposed this principle in Prishtina at the offices of “KOHËS Ditore”, in our meeting before leaving for Rambouillet. At the meeting were Fehmi Agani, Rexhep Qosja, Hydajet Hyseni, Bajram Kosumi and Blerim Shala. I proposed this idea to break the contradictions that arose when the KLA conditioned its participation in Rambouillet on the leadership of the Delegation.

My proposal was accepted and as a result we had a new political reality and value, unprecedented among the Albanians of Kosovo, we had consensus. This, also in practical terms, meant that the Agreement could only be accepted if all members of the Delegation accepted it, without exception. The voice of each member was equal and in the end we needed the consent of Hashim Thaçi, not because he was decisive, but because the consent of each member was decisive. And he had remained last, until the conversation with Mr. Rubin.

3.

Mr. Bajrami, in the tangle of often contradictory positions in the book, removes from the foreground two dramatic stories related to the KLA.

In one is Jakup Krasniqi, who as a member of the KLA becomes part of the Negotiating Group (called the Political-Strategic Group) together with Fehmi Agani, Mehmet Hajrizi and Blerim Shala. This group of negotiators, together with legal advisors (among whom is Mr. Bajrami) conduct negotiations with the mediation troika. After each round of negotiations, this group reports to the entire Delegation, receives instructions, recommendations and support and continues on. This group successfully overcomes the divisions, prejudices, tensions created throughout the nineties with daily work and a sense of community. Jakup Krasniqi is one of the key promoters of the functional unity of the Kosovo Delegation. Other members of the KLA - Xhavit Haliti, Ramë Buja and even in recent days in a more expressed form Azem Syla, are part of this effort to unite the positions of the entire Delegation. And, the day the idea for an interim Government of Kosovo was proposed, which would translate this unity into operational action, we were all in agreement on this, including the idea that its Prime Minister would be Jakup Krasniqi.

The other dramatic story, from the same day when the Provisional Government was to be declared, is that of Hashim Thaçi. On February 22, after almost three weeks of efforts to stop the Agreement from being reached, he declared that whoever signs the Agreement will step on the blood of martyrs, will be a traitor and will be treated as such. And, after these words, and some others that were to build his argument against it, he resigned from his post as Chairman of the Presidency.

4.

This story is not found in Mr. Bajrami's book. In the most difficult moments of Kosovo's history, the majority of its delegation understood that it had to preserve the valuable historical achievements that had been made at that Conference. It had to preserve the historic chance to end the war, to establish an international administration with NATO as a security force, and to create the conditions for self-determination. It had to accept the extended hand of help from Western democracies, led by the USA, a chance that comes only once in the history of the people of Kosovo. It had to preserve the achieved political unity, especially between the LDK and the KLA, and then, as it turned out, to preserve unity within the KLA itself. We had to avoid the temptation for one part of the Delegation to sign and the other to wonder if it would do so in two weeks.

This spirit in the KLA bore the name of Jakup Krasniqi and his three comrades in arms, and in the end Hashim Thaçi also joined it. Perhaps the temptation of Mr. Rubin may have played a role, but I also like to hope that in the end he may not have wanted to separate from his comrades, those who were wiser, more prudent and far-sighted, and who put the interest of Kosovo before personal protagonism.

Kosovo's victory in Rambouillet would not have been possible without the KLA; Kosovo's victory in Rambouillet was possible, despite Mr. Thaçi's attempt to fail.

5.

Academician Bajrami has the opportunity, with his book “The Rambouillet Conference and NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo”, to provide valuable elements of evaluation and explanation for understanding Rambouillet as a turning point of extraordinary importance in the history of Kosovo (and Europe at that time). Those elements would also be expressed with a clear methodological definition, writing discipline, professional editing of the text and review seriousness.

The Kosovo Academy of Sciences and Arts would do well to give this book a chance for change, by encouraging a book that meets basic publication criteria.