Anatomy of a lie (3)

How did Kosovo reject on February 22, 1999, the unilateral US offer to organize a referendum in 2002 to determine its permanent status?

1.

The source, or one source, of the untruths turns out to be Hashim Thaçi. In Academic Bajrami's book about Rambouillet, this quote is read from one of the two biographies written by foreign authors, I believe not without Mr. Thaçi's initiative and not without appropriate compensation for this:

In the biographical book of two British authors "New State, Modern Statesman" for President Hashim Thaçi, Thaçi himself provides clarifications on the progress of the negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris. The political representative of the KLA, Hashim Thaçi, according to British authors, was among the only ones who thought about the independence of Kosovo in Rambouillet, while for the international community and part of the Kosovo delegation this was utopian. There were two points, according to them, that divided Thaçi from the international community. Thaçi had insisted on having clarity on the status of Kosovo, through the organization of a referendum and if the Serbian side did not sign it, there should be NATO intervention. But, and after the great pressure that was put on a 31-year-old, Thaçi, according to the authors, had never given up on the inclusion of the people's right to self-determination and the other point that NATO should intervene if Serbia did not sign this agreement. “I made a plan that any agreement that would be signed should only be valid for three years. After a temporary period, the agreement should state that the people of Kosovo have the right to vote on their own future. So, that the people of Kosovo have the right to hold a referendum on self-determination,” Thaçi is quoted as saying to the British authors. According to the authors of the book, the greatest pressure during the negotiations was on Hashim Thaçi, because he was the biggest opponent. Finally, Albright and her spokesman, after long, arduous and pressure-filled talks, managed to convince Thaçi to sign the agreement.

Academic Bajrami distances himself from this quote by stating that:

"Of course, these approaches of the British authors are aimed at glorifying the figure of Hashim Thaçi, but in reality, the entire Kosovo delegation knew from the beginning that Rambouillet was not called for the independence of Kosovo, but for stopping the violence, repression and Serbian genocide in Kosovo. Before the start of the conference, the Kosovo delegation had accepted the ten points of the Contact Group, which did not talk about the independence of Kosovo, but about a transitional solution that would provide Kosovo with substantial autonomy within the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

2.

But, this distancing in this quote should have guided academic Bajrami about Mr. Thaçi's actions throughout the further assessments and throughout the entire book. And this was done by establishing that Hashim Thaçi did not make or contribute to any and no and only change in the Rambouillet Agreement, in any of the drafts, from the first to the last. Hashim Thaçi did not make any proposal in the text of the Agreement, consequently none of his proposals could have entered the Agreement. And the text of the Agreement that H. Thaçi (with Bajram Kosumi and someone else) rejected on February 20 is the same text of the Agreement supported by the Kosovo delegation on February 23 and the same text of the Agreement that the four members of the Presidency of the Kosovo Delegation, one of whom was H. Thaçi, signed in Paris on March 18.

This finding, however, is not accepted by academic Bajrami and in his book he continues H. Thaçi's lie as if it had been written by two biographers:

One of the important moments of the Rambouillet Conference, especially in its final part, was the insistent request of the Kosovo delegation for a referendum. First of all, the head of the delegation, Mr. Hashim Thaçi, insisted that the agreement, in addition to its term as a three-year interim agreement, should expressly contain a promise that after three years Kosovo would be able to hold a referendum on its independence. Thaçi had insisted that the Rambouillet agreement would not be signed without the referendum clause, and after much negotiation, former Secretary Albright agreed that the referendum clause should be part of the agreement..

3.

The statement that H. Thaçi convinced Secretary Albright “that the referendum clause should be part of the agreement” is untrue, and should not use the Kosovar version of this word, and academician Bajrami himself should know this best. The political-strategic group, during the three weeks of negotiations, and especially the last week, had conducted intensive negotiations with the negotiators (Americans, Europeans and Russians) to specify the duration and form of determining the permanent status of Kosovo. The entire effort of this group was made with the full consensual support of all members of the Kosovo delegation and on February 20, this formulation was reached:

“Three years after the entry into force of this agreement, an international meeting will be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, based on the will of the people, the opinions of the relevant authorities, the efforts of each party regarding the implementation of this agreement, as well as the Helsinki Final Act.”

The members of this group, Fehmi Agani, Jakup Krasniqi, Mehmet Hajrizi and Blerim Shala, achieved the maximum possible negotiation in close cooperation with American mediators by including in the text the formulation "on the basis of the will of the people" which is a not-so-hidden reference to self-determination.

Academician Bajrami should have known this, he was a legal advisor to this group and a valuable contributor to its work.

4.

In fact, the "referendum point" has another story that academic Bajrami could have known either by remembering what happened in the hall or by reading the books of Blerim Shala, Marc Weller, Tim Judah and others.

In the continuation of the three-day conference, I asked Secretary Albright for the opportunity to formulate a letter (“side letter”) that would express the official American interpretation of the referendum when it comes to the wording in the Agreement on the permanent status of Kosovo. We had reached the end of the road in the negotiations, there was no longer any possibility of changing even a single sentence; Blerim Shala tried at the last moment to insert the addition “the expressed will of the people” but despite all the sympathy of the American mediators, no change was achieved in the text.

After a consultation between Mrs. Albright and her team in the plenary hall, Jim O'Brien, the chief counsel of the American delegation, came and handed me Secretary Albright's letter. He stood in the hall while I read it aloud to the members of the delegation and told me that the letter was only valid within that day, if the Kosovo delegation accepted the Agreement. If not, it would be considered invalid.

The letter said this:

Rambouillet, February 22, 1999

This letter concerns the proposed wording (attached) for Chapter 8, Article 1(3) of the Interim Framework Agreement. We will consider this proposal, or any other wording, of that article that may be adopted at Rambouillet, as confirmation of the right of the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum on the final status of Kosovo after three years.

With respect,

Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State

5.

International lawyers – Paul Williams and Marc Weller and the seasoned diplomat M. Abramowitz – could hardly believe that we had reached that point of American support. The Secretary of State's letter was considered a US obligation under the Vienna Convention, whoever was in power in the US in the future.

But, as Academician Bajrami notes, some in our delegation began to mock and ask where the seal was and is this document valid without a seal?

Academic Bajrami was also able to ascertain that the man who led the rejection was Hashim Thaçi. On February 22, 1999, Kosovo rejected the unilateral US offer to organize a referendum in 2002 to determine its permanent status.

(Tomorrow: Lesson of Rambouillet: The KLA does not have (a) name)

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