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Radio Free Europe
- August 29, 2026 15:30
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Six months after US and Israeli air strikes on Iran triggered a conflict that has rocked energy markets and disrupted global shipping, there is still no clear end to the confrontation. While Iran's military capabilities have been severely damaged, it still has influence in the Strait of Hormuz.
Ekspertët e intervistuar nga Radio Evropa e Lirë, nga i gjithë spektri politik në Uashington, thonë se faza e ardhshme do të përcaktohet nga katër pyetje: sa gjatë mund t'i bëjë ballë Irani presionit ekonomik, a mund ta shndërrojë diplomacia avantazhin ushtarak në një marrëveshje të qëndrueshme, çfarë do të ndodhë me Hormuzin dhe nëse Rusia dhe Kina do ta ndihmojnë Teheranin të rindërtohet.
"Economic offensive"
Retired Vice Admiral Robert Harward, former deputy commander of U.S. Central Command, describes the situation as a “stable state.” But he argues that time is running out for Tehran.
"Time is their biggest problem," Harward tells Radio Free Europe, noting that the continued economic pressure could eventually turn into an internal threat to the Iranian government.
Issues related to basic needs fueled mass protests in December-January, which were suppressed with brutal force, when thousands of protesters were killed.
Kështu po e paraqet tani Uashingtoni konfliktin, me sekretarin e Thesarit, Scott Bessent, që më 24 gusht njoftoi atë që e quajti një “ofensivë ekonomike” masash për izolimin e mëtejmë të Iranit. Bessent do t'u bëjë presion ministrave të Financave të G20-ës për këtë çështje gjatë takimeve në Ashevill të Karolinës së Veriut, më 31 gusht dhe 1 shtator.
Harward says the pressure could turn into an internal threat if Tehran eventually faces difficulty paying the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij militia and other state institutions, or if ordinary Iranians face shortages of fuel and other essential items.
Winter conditions, he says, can make the pressure especially significant.
China is key in this calculation.
Elaine Dezenski, director of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, says China's economic relationship with Iran is important, but it is not an alliance in the traditional sense.
About 80 percent of the oil exported from Iran goes to China, she says, but Iranian oil accounts for only about 12 to 13 percent of China's crude oil imports.
“Nëse Kina do të ndërpriste blerjet e naftës iraniane... kjo do të kishte një efekt të madh”, thotë Dezenski. Megjithatë, deri tani Pekini i ka rezistuar presionit të SHBA-së lidhur me marrëdhëniet e tij tregtare me Teheranin.
The issue also has a long-term financial dimension. Selling Iranian oil in yuan and making payments through systems outside the US dollar network could strengthen alternative financial infrastructure.
"The way Iran is conducting these transactions and the way China is supporting these transactions is an attempt to undermine the role of the US dollar in the global energy market," Dezenski said.
Can diplomacy be restored?
Teksa mundësia për veprime të mëtejme ushtarake nuk është përjashtuar, zyrtarët kanë sugjeruar se veprimet ushtarake mund të kenë arritur kufijtë e efektivitetit të tyre - me fjalë të tjera, nuk ka shumë objektiva të tjera për t'u sulmuar.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in June that Iran's defense industrial base had suffered "massive destruction," with 80 to 90 percent of the damage. President Donald Trump initially said 90 percent of Iran's missiles and launch sites had been destroyed, later giving an estimate of 82 percent. But he has repeatedly said that the Iranian navy has been destroyed.
However, what remains has proven to be durable enough to impede shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
For Bradley Bowman, director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the key difference is between military weakening and a long-term political outcome.
“America has consistently struggled in the Middle East to translate battlefield success into lasting, positive political outcomes,” Bowman tells REL. “We often win on the battlefield and lose at the negotiating table.”
He emphasizes that a lasting political transformation in Iran would require decisive action by the Iranians themselves. Washington, he adds, does not have the political will to send “thousands and thousands” of troops to Iran and to bear the losses that such an operation would entail.
Bowman also says the war has exposed the scale of American spending on weapons and raised questions about the amount of offensive and defensive munitions available for other potential conflicts,
Mixed signals are coming from Iran.
Some elements, including the IRGC, appear in no hurry to push forward with talks before the US midterm elections in November. Other senior members of the clerical establishment have recently spoken repeatedly about economic hardship and the importance of reviving diplomacy.
Hormuz: Iran's main lever
For Gawdat Bahgat, professor of national security affairs at the Center for Near East and South Asian Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, the most significant development of the past six months may be the emergence of the Strait of Hormuz as the main instrument Iran has left to negotiate.
"Even if an interim agreement is signed, it will be temporary, but in the future they will continue to threaten to close the strait," he says.
This waterway traditionally transports about a fifth of the world's oil, liquefied natural gas and other vital goods. This has also translated into economic pressure on the United States as global markets push up gasoline prices.
The strait is only about 39 kilometers wide at its narrowest point. Both Iran and Oman claim the maximum 22.2 kilometers allowed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as territorial waters, meaning there are no international waters in this area.
UNCLOS aims to guarantee the right of transit passage for commercial ships and prohibits their blockade. However, Tehran has never ratified UNCLOS and says it is not bound by the treaty. The US has also not ratified it.
Bahgat says Gulf states could push for a deal that restores stability, even if it formalizes a certain role for Iran in the strait. Their priority, he says, is restoring economic stability.
The more difficult question is whether Washington can accept some form of Iranian control or economic benefit from this waterway.
Bowman argues that the critical issue is whether merchant ship captains and insurance companies consider the route safe.
Therefore, Iran does not necessarily need to completely close Hormuz. Sporadic missile or drone attacks could increase the costs of securing ships and hamper maritime transport, while attacks on infrastructure in Persian Gulf states could create additional pressure on countries cooperating with Washington.
"This effectively turns our Arab partners into an instrument of pressure that Iran is exerting on Washington," Bowman emphasizes.
Aid from Russia and China to Iran
Another important question is whether Iran's external partners can help it recover.
Bowman cites Chinese shipments of chemical agents and Russian targeting intelligence, as well as drone support, as evidence of increased aid. He says Moscow is considering sending Su-35 fighter jets to Iran, while Beijing could shift from supplying dual-use materials to sending weapons and ammunition.
The future of this support, he says, will depend largely on how Beijing and Moscow assess the potential US response.
"The main thing China fears is secondary sanctions from the US," says Bowman.
Njoftimi i sekretarit Bessent lë të kuptohet për këto masa, por ato mbartin gjithashtu rrezikun e hakmarrjes kineze dhe nuk është e qartë se deri ku është i gatshëm Uashingtoni ta rrisë presionin e këtij lloji.
Iran's military recovery cannot be separated from the broader network that supports it, says Bowman.
A study led by Bowman documented 616 instances of security cooperation between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea from January 2019 to December 2025, including areas such as weapons development and transfer, military exercises, intelligence sharing and military diplomacy.