Blerim Shala on POINT with Veton Surroin

Shala: In the early 90s, the biggest mistake was the lack of diplomatic organization

Writer and activist Blerim Shala has stated that during 1991–1992, Kosovo objectively had very few opportunities to act differently, but the biggest mistake of that time was the lack of better political and diplomatic organization in the international arena.

In a conversation on the PIKċ podcast with the publicist Veton SurroiShala said that, although serious efforts have been made, there have also been mistakes, failures and omissions, especially in terms of diplomatic representation.

According to him, given that the main goal of Kosovo's policy was to secure the support of the international factor, especially the United States of America, a Kosovo representative office in the US should have been opened at that time.

"We have had problems in Tirana as well, and not in Washington. Many names have been circulated for representatives, but in the end there was a lack of political will," Shala stressed, adding that the American side had also given signals that such a representation would not prejudice the status of Kosovo.
He stressed that Germany had made a great sacrifice by allowing the functioning of the Kosovo Government in exile, at a time when it still had relatively normal relations with Yugoslavia. Shala also recalled that the so-called “three percent” contribution of the diaspora in Germany had been facilitated by the German state itself, by excluding it from the tax base.

According to Shala, Kosovo had the opportunity to open representative offices in other friendly countries such as Italy or the United Kingdom, as well as to engage more strongly in international conferences, where it had already begun to participate.

On the other hand, Surroi emphasized that despite internal, political and personal disagreements, the leadership of that time had managed to maintain a high level of political unity, by not taking the conflicts outside.

"During that period, we did our utmost to maintain unity and to reach where we reached at the end of 1992, with the 'Christmas Threat'," Surroi added.
 

Shala: The "Christmas Threat" was the basic document of American policy towards the Milosevic regime

The United States' "Christmas Threat" was a defining moment for Kosovo and one of the strongest documents of American policy towards the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, said writer and activist Blerim Shala.

In a conversation on the PIKċ podcast with the publicist Veton SurroiShala recalled that during 1991–1992 there were intensive and direct contacts between Albanian political representatives and American diplomacy, including the State Department, the National Security Council, and the American Congress.

According to him, in the fall of 1992, the American side had informed them that an extraordinary decision was being prepared for Kosovo, which would materialize in what was later called the "Christmas Threat" - a unilateral US threat to Serbia, without invoking NATO or any other international mechanism.

Shala emphasized that this threat did not come "from the sky", but was the result of strategic analyses by the highest American institutions, as well as new political developments in Serbia, where the emergence of Milan Panić created a real risk of Milošević losing power.

He said that there was great pressure from US senators for Kosovo Albanians to participate in the December 1992 elections in Serbia, with the reasoning that the democratization of Serbia would bring more favorable circumstances for Kosovo. However, according to Shala, participation in the elections was extremely problematic and was rejected.

In this context, he emphasized that in 1992 there was no sign that the Kosovo Albanians were preparing for war; on the contrary, signs indicated that Milošević might start a conflict in Kosovo to avoid losing power.

The “Christmas Threat” was described by Shala as brutal because it was the first time the US directly warned that it would intervene militarily if Serbia was responsible for the outbreak of war in Kosovo. According to him, this message shocked Milosevic and served as a deterrent.

He added that this threat was left as a legacy by President George HW Bush and was later reconfirmed by the Bill Clinton administration, remaining a basic document of American policy towards Kosovo until the late 90s.
 

Shala: The Croats have deceived both us and the Slovenes

Publicist and activist Blerim Shala has stated that during the early 90s, Croatia deceived both Albanian and Slovenian political factors, by not respecting cooperation agreements in the circumstances of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

In a conversation on the PIKË podcast, the publicist Veton Surroi recalled the 1991 meeting in Stubicke Toplice, which, according to him, was a joint idea of ​​Croats and some Albanian activists to discuss the possibility of a joint mobilization in what was called the Southern Front.

He stressed that the meeting was attended by representatives from Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Presevo, as well as delegates from the Kosovo Assembly in exile and members of the Government. The aim was to unite political factors and avoid isolated initiatives that would push Kosovo towards a war for which it was not prepared.

Shala admitted that there was also naivety at that time, as some believed that through public meetings and the presence of television cameras, a kind of declaration of war could be declared. He said that some participants had prepared such speeches, mentioning Mahmut Bakalli as one of the figures involved.

The conversation also mentioned consultations with the Slovenian and Croatian sides. Shala said that he had personal contacts with Janez Janša, who later became the Minister of Defense of Slovenia. According to him, Janša had clearly suggested to him that the Albanians should not enter the war, emphasizing that Kosovo was not prepared and that the right moment should be waited for.

Speaking about regional cooperation, Shala said that he was ready for a coalition between Croatia, Kosovo, Slovenia and North Macedonia, but according to him, Croatia had repeatedly deceived its partners. He recalled that there was an agreement between Croatia and Slovenia that, if one was attacked, the other would enter the war, but when Slovenia was attacked, Croatia did not react.

Surroi added that even former President Ibrahim Rugova, after his first meeting with Franjo Tudjman, did not meet with him again, realizing that cooperation had no real benefit.

The podcast also discussed contacts with the former president of Albania, Ramiz Alia, who, according to Shala, had rejected Croatian offers to send weapons to Kosovo, emphasizing that neither Albania nor Kosovo were prepared for war at the time.

However, both interlocutors emphasized that despite these developments, some Croatian figures had been supportive of the Albanian cause, particularly in humanitarian and documentation matters, as well as in the withdrawal of Albanian soldiers from the Yugoslav People's Army at the beginning of the war in Croatia.